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I. INTRODUCTION

In the words of its Charter, the United Nations was founded "to save
succeeding generations from the scourge of war."' As the 2000 Report of
the Panel on U.N. Peace Operations (more commonly known as the
Brahimi Report) acknowledges, "Meeting this challenge is the most
important function of the Organization and ... [is] the yardstick by which

[the Organization] is judged by the peoples it exists to serve."2 In the
words of the organization's most effective Secretary-General, Dag
Hammarskj6ld, "the founders of the U.N. created the organization not to
bring mankind to heaven but to save it from hell."3 In her memoirs
covering her tenure as Ambassador to the United Nations and Secretary of
State, Madeleine Albright likens the United Nations to the world's night
watchman.4
1. U.N. Charter pmbl.
2. Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, 1, U.N. GAOR, 55th Sess.,
U.N. Doc. A/55/305 (Aug. 21, 2000) [hereinafter Brahimi Report].
3. DAVID RIEFF, AT THE POINT OF A GuN: DEMOCRATIC DREAMS AND ARMED
INTERVENTION 79 (2005).
4. MADELEINE ALBRIGHT, MADAM SECRETARY: A MEMOIR 155 (2003) ("[The United
Nations] can monitor and raise the alarm, but it cannot guarantee that the alarm, once sounded, will
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Throughout the post-Cold War World, the United Nations has failed to
"save succeeding generations from war." At times, it has even facilitated,
through its inaction and incompetency bringing hell to mankind.5 In
several instances, the night watchman was asleep on duty, and failed to
sound the alarm. In those instances when he was awake, he stumbled into
an operation with far too few, lightly armed peacekeepers when there was
no peace to keep; all the while exhorting consent, impartiality, and a
prohibition on force unless in self-defense, when what was needed was a
U.N. version of the Powell Doctrine.6 The United Nations has proven itself
entirely incapable of managing Chapter VII military operations in the postCold War world.7 As a result, in the maintenance of international peace

be answered."). In a 1994 summer article, The Economist referred to the United Nations as an
ambulance driver. United Nations Peacekeeping; Trotting to the Rescue, ECONOMIST, June 25,
1994, at 19 [hereinafter UN. Peacekeeping] ("No longer thought of as world cop, the United
Nations still provides an ambulance service. A pity it takes so long to answer a call.").
5. See, e.g., the harrowing remarks of Judge Riad of the International Criminal Tribunal for
the Former Yugoslavia in issuing its indictment of Karadzic and Mladic:
After Srebrenica fell to besieging Serbian forces in July 1995, a truly terrible
massacre of the Muslim population appears to have taken place. The evidence
tendered by the Prosecutor describes scenes of unimaginable savagery: thousands
of men executed and buried in mass grave s [sic], hundreds of men buried alive,
men and women mutilated and slaughtered, children killed before their mothers'
eyes, a grandfather forced to eat the liver of his own grandson. These are truly
scenes from hell, written on the darkest pages of human history.
Report of the Secretary-GeneralPursuant to General Assembly Resolution 53/35: The Fall of
Srebrenica,U.N. Doc. A/54/549, para. 2 (Nov. 15, 1999) [hereinafter U.N. Report on Srebrenica].
6. General Colin Powell first articulated the "Powell Doctrine" in the run-up to the first Gulf
War, although it has been argued that the doctrine has its antecedents in policy articulated by
Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger. Simply, the doctrine states that when the nation engages
in war, every resource should be used to achieve overwhelming force against the enemy. See
generally Colin L. Powell, U.S. Forces: ChallengesAhead, FOREIGN AFF., Winter 1992/1993, at
32.
7. In his Supplement to an Agenda for Peace, written a decade ago, Secretary-General
Boutros Boutros-Ghali acknowledged as much: "[N]either the Security Council nor the SecretaryGeneral at present has the capacity to deploy, direct, command and control operations for this
purpose." Supplement to an Agenda for Peace: Position Paper of the Secretary-General on the
Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations, 77, U.N. GAOR, 50th Sess., U.N.
Doc. A/50/60, S/1995/1 (Jan. 3, 1995) [hereinafter Supplement to Agenda for Peace]. BoutrosGhali's successor, Kofi Annan, has admitted the same. In the 1997 U.N. Report of Reform, he
acknowledged:
The United Nations does not have, at this point in its history, the institutional
capacity to conduct military enforcement measures under Chapter VII. Under
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and security, the United Nations lacks any credibility, which according to
the former Secretary-General is one of the organization's "indispensable
assets." 8 Fundamental change is therefore necessary "to save succeeding
generations from war" and to save mankind from hell.
This Article examines those changes by taking a holistic approach to
peace operations. 9 Part II considers the legal authority for peace
operations. In particular, it considers the growing debate over the balance

present conditions, ad hoc... Member States offer the most effective deterrent to
aggression or to the escalation or spread of an ongoing conflict.
Secretary-General Kofi Annan, Renewing the United Nations: A Programmefor Reform, 107,
U.N. Doc. A/51/ (July 14, 1997). Some scholars suggest that the United Nations may simply be
institutionally incapable of doing what is required in the post-Cold War to maintain peace and
security. The 1990s have consistently proven the limited applicability of traditional peacekeeping
in vicious intra-state conflicts when coercion rather than consent is the norm. Yet, repeatedly, the
United Nations has proven unwilling to use armed force in such circumstances. Part of the problem
is certainly a lack of political will, but as Ruth Wedgwood notes, it goes far deeper than that. She
explains, "[iut is also engendered by an ethos of nonviolence within the United Nations.... [and]
an unwillingness to admit that collective security requires robust action." Ruth Wedgwood, The
Institutefor GlobalLegal Studies InauguralColloquium: The UN. and the Protection of Human
Rights: UnitedNations PeacekeepingOperationsand the Use of Force, 5 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y
69, 75, 78 (2001). To be successful, peacekeepers must be trained as soldiers first. It may be that
the United Nations is simply incapable of doing that. Walt Rostow has also suggested that the U.N.
"commitment to respect national sovereignty [is] so deeply embedded" that it is incapable of acting
in intra-state conflicts. See Walt W. Rostow, Regionalism in a Global System, in FROM GLOBALISM
TO REGIONALISM: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON U.S. FOREIGN AND DEFENSE POLICIES 129 (Patrick M.
Cronin ed. 1993).
8. Anna Roberts, "Soldieringon in Hope ": UnitedNationsPeacekeepingin Civil Wars, 35
N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 839, 884 (2003) (quoting Kofi A. Annan, Challenges of the New
Peacekeeping,in PEACEMAKING AND PEACEKEEPING FOR THENEW CENTURY 186 (OlaraA. Otunnu
& Michael W. Doyle eds., 1988) ("The organization's legitimacy and credibility [are] its
indispensable assets.")).
9. Throughout this Article, the term peace operations is used as a general term to include
peacekeeping activities taken under Chapter VI of the U.N. Charter and peace enforcement
activities taken under Chapter VII. The U.S. military's most recent promulgation on the subject
defines peace operations in the following manner: "A broad term that encompasses peacekeeping
operations and peace enforcement operations conducted in support ofdiplomatic efforts to establish
and maintain peace." U.S. ARMY TRAINING & DOCTRINE COMMAND, PEACE OPERATIONS, MULTISERVICE TACTICS, TECHNIQUES, AND PROCEDURES FOR CONDUCTING PEACE OPERATIONS, FM 307.31, 179 (2003). Peacekeeping is defined as "[m]ilitary operations undertaken with the consent
of all major parties to a dispute, designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an agreement
(ceasefire, truce, or other such agreement) and support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term
political settlement." Id. at 178-79. Peace enforcement is defined as "[a]pplication of military force,
or the threat of its use, normally pursuant to international authorization, to compel compliance with
resolutions or sanctions designed to maintain or restore peace and order." Id. at 178.
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between a "Westphalian Sovereignty" model and a normative imperative
to uphold human rights.
Part 11 considers the evolution of peace operations from the traditional
peacekeeping operations conducted during the Cold War to the
multidimensional peacekeeping operations of today. Through case studies
of peace operations conducted in the 1990s, the limited applicability of
traditional peacekeeping in the post-Cold War world is illustrated.
Part IV considers the evolution of American peace operations doctrine
beginning with National Security Directive 74, written in 1993. This part
also considers American efforts to improve African peacekeeping
capabilities begun under the Clinton administration and continuing under
President George W. Bush.
Part V considers the ever-increasing role African regional organizations
have to play in African conflicts. An expanded role is of great importance
for three reasons. First, since the end of the Cold War, Africa has
experienced a marginalization in international affairs. This manifests itself
in a lack of political will by Western nations to become involved in
African conflicts. Having African forces undertake peace operations in
Africa may therefore be the only way to avoid future Rwandas and
Darfurs. 0 Second, there are more conflicts in Africa than any other region
in the world." Finally, the peace and security situation in Africa is a major
10. U.S. INSTITUTE OF PEACE, SPECIAL REPORT: PEACEKEEPING IN AFRICA (Feb. 13, 2001)
[hereinafter USIP Report], availableat http://www.usip.org/pubs/special reports/sr66.html ("[Tihe
lack of political will by Western key governments is the major impediment hindering the
deployment and success of U.N. peacekeeping missions in Africa. In short, few foreign leaders are
willing to risk the loss of soldiers in poorly understood lands where there may be no perceived
national interest."). See also Happyton M. Bonyongwe, Employing African Forces, in
PEACEKEEPING AND PEACE ENFORCEMENT IN AFRICA 94-95 (Robert I. Rotberg ed., 2000). This
marginalization has come to be acutely recognized by Africans in recent years. As OAU SecretaryGeneral Salim remarked in an address in 1997:
OAU Member States can no longer afford to stand aloof and expect the
International Community to care more for our problems than we do, or indeed to
find solutions to those problems which in many instances, have been of our own
making. The simple truth that we must confront today, is that the world does not
owe us a living and we must remain in the forefront of efforts to act and act
speedily, to prevent conflicts from getting out of control.
Id. at 85 (quoting Salim Ahmed Salim, OAU Secretary-General, Opening Address to the Second
Meeting of the Chiefs of Def. Staff of Member States of the OAU Cent. Organ (Oct. 25, 1997)).
11. In December 2006, the United Nations reported 80,368 deployed peacekeepers. UNITED
NATIONS, DEP'T OF PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS, U.N. MISSIONS SUMMARY OF MILITARY POLICE,

http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/contributors/2006/decO6 4.pdf(last visited Jan. 31, 2007). Out
of this figure, 70,743, or 88% of the peacekeepers were serving in Africa. Id. This trend is likely
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concern for the international community1 2 as African conflicts tend to
impact civilian populations, particularly women and children, more
deleteriously than other contemporary conflicts. 3 The need for such a
force is therefore beyond dispute. This is a time of great hope and promise
for the idea of "African solutions to African problems." With proper
support and assistance, the West can assure that the full potential of
African organizations is realized in maintaining peace and international
security on the continent.

II. THE AUTHORITY

FOR PEACE OPERATIONS

"History is a myth that men agree to believe." 4 Napoleon
A. Wither Westphalia?
The norms governing contemporary theories of international relations
have evolved from the sovereign state system established by the Peace of
Westphalia. 5 Signed in Munster on October 24, 1648, the Treaty of Peace

to continue, as "intercommunal mayhem has been a growing feature of modem Africa." Robert I.
Rotberg, African Responses to African Crises: Creating a Military Response, in PEACEKEEPING
AND PEACE ENFORCEMENT INAFRICA 98 (Ericka A. Albaugh et al. eds., 2000). As ofJanuary 2007,
ofthe fifteen U.N. peacekeeping operations, six were located in Africa. They include: U.N. Mission
in the Sudan (UNMIS); the U.N. Operation in C6te d'Ivoire (UNOCI); the U.N. Mission in Liberia
(UNMIL); the U.N. Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC); the
U.N. Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE); and the U.N. Mission for the Referendum in
Western Sahara (MINURSO). See UNITED NATIONS, DEP'T OF PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS,
CURRENT OPERATIONS, http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/index.asp (last visited Jan. 30,2007).
The U.N. Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) and the U.N. Operation in Burundi (ONUB)
completed their mandates in 2005 and 2006, respectively. Id.
12. See infra note 313 and accompanying text.
13. See, e.g., Abiodun Alao, The Role ofAfrican Regional andSub-RegionalOrganizations
in Conflict Prevention and Resolution, 23 J. HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE (2001), at
www.jha.ac/articles/u023.htm. One possible reason for this unfortunate trend may be that many
forces in African conflicts, particularly when they involve warlords, are unable to rely on tactical
skill and therefore rely on terror. See, e.g., Tony Clayton, African Military Capabilities in
Insurrection,Intervention and Peace Support Operations, in AFRICAN INTERVENTIONIST STATES
51 (Oliver Furley & Roy May eds., 2001).
14. History News Network, Quotes about History, http://hnn.us/articles/1328.html (last
visited Oct. 26, 2006).
15. The Peace was a series of peace treaties between the Holy Roman Empire and her
continental rivals. SIMON CHESTERMAN, You, THE PEOPLE VII (2004). For the full text, see Treaty
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ended the Thirty Years War 6 and provided for a community of formally
equal and sovereign states free from external authority.' 7 One of the
twentieth century's keenest legal thinkers, Leo Gross, has written that
"[t]he Peace of Westphalia ...marks the end of an epoch and the opening
of another. It represents the majestic portal which leads from the old into
the new world."' 8 The new world Gross spoke of is one of sovereign states.
Sovereignty, according to the World Court in the famous Wimbledon case,
means that the state "is subject to no other state and has full and exclusive
powers within its jurisdiction without prejudice to the limits set by
applicable law." 19 Such a view treats sovereignty and nonintervention as
forming "two sides of the same coin."' As R.J. Vincent succinctly
surmises, "if sovereignty, then nonintervention."21
If, however, as Napoleon suggested, "history is a myth that men agree
to believe," the misconstrued Peace of Westphalia is one of the most
persistent myths of history, sitting at the very center of the debate over the
proper authority for peace operations. In contrast to the "Westphalian
myth," the peace settlements were, in actuality, "silent on the issue of
sovereignty, [or] . . . any corollary of sovereignty . . . such as,
nonintervention."2 Indeed, the norm of nonintervention was not clearly
articulated until the end of the eighteenth century, primarily by Vattel. 23 A
fundamental precept of the norm of intervention is that state leaders should
be able to formulate their relationship with those they rule independent of
of Westphalia, http://fletcher.tufts.edu/multi/texts/historical/westphalia.txt (last visited Oct. 26,
2006).
16. The Thirty Years' War was in actuality, a series of wars fought between 1618 and 1648,
principally on the territory of modem-day Germany, involving most of the major continental
powers. Although the war was fought for a number of reasons, the Thirty Years' War was primarily
a religious conflict between Protestants and Catholics. See generally STEPHEN D. KRASNER,
SOVEREIGNTY 33-34 (1999).
17. MARY ELLEN O'CONNELL, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE 114 (2005).
18. Leo Gross, The Peace of Westphalia 1648-1948, 42 AM. J.INT'L L. 20, 28 (1948).

19. The Case of the S.S. Wimbledon, 1923 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) no. 1, at X (June 28).
20. Victoria Tin-Bor Hui, ProblematizingSovereignty, in INTERNATIONALINTERVENTION IN
THE POST-COLD WAR WORLD 85 (Michael C. Davis et al. eds., 2004) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL
INTERVENTION] (quoting ROBERT H. JACKSON, QUASI-STATES: SOVEREIGNTY, INTERNATIONAL

RELATIONS AND THE THIRD WORLD 127 (1990)).
21. Id. (quoting R.J. VINCENT, HUMAN RIGHTS AND WORLD POLiTIcS 4 (1983)).

22. Andreas Osiander, Sovereignty, InternationalRelations, and the Westphalian Myth,55
INT'L ORGS. 251, 266 (2001).

23. KRASNER, supra note 16, at 20-21. Emmerick de Vattel defined intervention in the
eighteenth century as a "breach of the sovereignty of the target state." Thomas G. Otte, Military
Intervention: Conclusions and Reflections, in MILITARY INTERVENTION: FROM GUNBOAT
DIPLOMACY TO HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION 197-98 (Andrew M. Dorman & Thomas G. Otte
eds., 1995) [hereinafter MILITARY INTERVENTION].
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external forces.24 Thus, if a ruler of a state wishes to grant ethnic
minorities within the state increased autonomy, it can do so. Similarly, if
the same ruler chooses to strip an ethnic minority of basic rights and treat
them brutally, he may do so as well, for this too would be entirely within
the state's "domestic jurisdiction." In contrast to such a norm, several
provisions of the Treaty of Peace actually endorsed intervention in internal
affairs. As Victoria Tin-Bor Hui illustrates:
The treaty terms included extensive provisions that fixed the
religious affiliations of principalities as they were on January
1, 1624, irrespective of the changing preferences of princes.
The settlements even stipulated basic constitutional relations
between the Holy Roman Emperor and various
principalities-and such "internal" matters were guaranteed
by the victorious powers France and Sweden.
Nor, as the Westphalian myth would have one believe, are international
interventions the exception. Rather, as Michael Doyle argues, "[they] are
in many ways ordinary topics in international relations."26 Stephen Krasner
echoes this. He argues that political entities have always been subject to
international intervention, "whether this involved the formation of
Protestant polities in the sixteenth century, of absolute monarchies in the
seventeenth century, of republics in the nineteenth century, or of27fascist,
communist, and now democratic states in the twentieth century.
Today, peace operations directly challenge state sovereignty and there
is an important debate as to what extent members of the international
community should be allowed to intervene in matters essentially within the
domestic jurisdiction of another state.28 Perhaps, however, this is the
wrong debate. Perhaps, as Daniel Philpott suggests,
"It is not that
29
was.,
quite
never
it
that
is
it
is;
longer
no
sovereignty
24. MILITARY INTERVENTION, supra note 23, at 73.
25. Tin-Bor Hui, Problematizing Sovereignty, in INTERNATIONALINTERVENTION, supra note

20, at 86-87 (internal citations omitted).
26. MICHAEL W. DOYLE, WAYS OF WAR AND PEACE: REALISM, LIBERALISM, AND SOCIALISM
422 (1997).
27. Tin-Bor Hui, Problematizing Sovereignty, in INTERNATIONAL INTERVENTION, supra note
20, at 87 (quoting KRASNER, supra note 16, at 37).
28. See infra notes 115-29 and accompanying text.
29. Tin-Bor Hui, ProblematizingSovereignty, in INTERNATIONALINTERVENTION, supra note
20, at 87 (quoting Daniel Philpott, Usurping the Sovereignty ofSovereignty, 53 WORLD POLITICS
316 (2001)). Similarly, in his 1992 treatise, An Agenda for Peace, the Secretary-General notes,

"Respect for (the State's] fundamental sovereignty and integrity are crucial to any common
international progress. The time of absolute and exclusive sovereignty, however, has passed; its
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Krasner has made an important contribution to the study of sovereignty
through what he has referred to as "unbundling" sovereignty.3" Rather than
accept the notion that sovereignty must be unitary, Krasner distinguishes
four distinct types: 1) Domestic Sovereignty: the effective organization of
public authority within a state;3 ' 2) Independent Sovereignty: the ability
of a state to regulate the flow of goods and persons across its territorial
borders;3 2 3) International Legal Sovereignty: the recognition and
acceptance of a state as the juridical equal of other states;33 and 4)
Westphalian Sovereignty: the exclusion of external actors from domestic
authority structures.34
Krasner's four distinctions provide a valuable lens for examining the
legal authority for peace operations. Implicit in his distinctions is that the
different types of sovereignties can be "unbundled" from one another. For
example, Taiwan possesses domestic, interdependence, and Westphalian
sovereignties but lacks international legal sovereignty. 35 Through this
multidimensional concept of sovereignty, 36 Krasner comes to the
substantial insight that sovereignty is not necessarily the antithesis of
intervention.37 While certain peace operations may violate a state's
Westphalian sovereignty, as it imposes external authority structures, it may
be a necessary requirement to restore domestic sovereignty.3"
theory was never matched by reality." Secretary-General, An Agenda for Peace: Preventive
Diplomacy, Peacemaking,and Peace-keeping,U.N. Doe. A/47/277-S/24111, para. 17 (June 17,
1992) [hereinafter An Agenda for Peace].
30. Robert 0. Keohane, Political Authority After Intervention, in HUMANITARIAN
INTERVENTION: ETHICAL, LEGAL, AND POLITICAL DILEMMAS 284 (J.L. Holzgrefe & Robert 0.
Keohane eds., 2003) [hereinafter HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION].
31. KRASNER, supra note 16, at 11-12.

32. Id.at 12-14.
33. Id. at 14-15
34. Id. at 20.
35. Keohane, PoliticalAuthorityAfter Intervention,in HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION, supra
note 30, at 285.
36. The four paradigms suggested by Krasner are not the only gradations of sovereignty. In
their important book, The New Sovereignty:Compliancewith InternationalRegulatoryAgreements,
Chayes and Chayes propose a "managerial model" of sovereignty founded upon the advantages of
cooperation for regime compliance. See generallyABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES,
THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY: COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS (1996).

37. Tin-Bor Hui, ProblematizingSovereignty, in INTERNATIONAL INTERVENTION, supranote

20, at 87.
38. Keohane, PoliticalAuthorityAfterlntervention,in HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION, supra

note 30, at 286. William J. Durch, senior associate at the Henry L. Stimson Center, makes a similar
point, arguing that "humanitarian interventions may also be viewed as an effort to protect the
source of a state's sovereignty, namely, its populace, from the ravages of civil war or a renegade
government." William J. Durch, Keeping the Peace: Politicsand Lessons of the 1990s, in U.N.
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B. Sovereignty and the Post World War
1. The United Nations and the "Two Sovereignties"39
Prior to the Second World War, the norm of nonintervention was firmly
established.40 In 1945, the U.N. Charter reaffirmed this norm. A general
prohibition against intervention and the sovereignty of states finds its
clearest support in article two of the U.N. Charter. Article 2(4) prohibits
Member States from threatening or using "force against the territorial
integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner
inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations."' According to the
International Court of Justice, article 2(4) has become a part of customary
rule, applicable to all states. 42 The Charter recognizes only two exceptions
to the prohibition on the use of force. The first is that force may be used
in self-defense. Article 51 recognizes the "inherent right of individual or
collective self-defense."4' 3 The second exception applies once the Security
Council has determined the "existence of any threat to the peace, breach

PEACEKEEPING, AMERICAN POLITICS AND THE UNCIVIL WARS OF THE 1990s, at 5 (William J. Durch

ed., 1996) [hereinafter U.N. PEACEKEEPING].
39. The phrase refers to what Secretary-General Annan has juxtaposed as the "two
sovereignties" of states and of human beings. THOMAS G. WEISS, MILITARY-CIVILIAN
INTERACTIONS 21 (2005).
40. Comfort Ero and Suzanne Long note that prior to the Second World War:
The League of Nations did not provide for a right to intervene. Among the
conventions during the interwar period, the 1928 Convention on the Duties and
Rights in the Event of Civil Strife prohibited intervention even by nations of one
state in the affairs of another. Similarly, the 1933 Montevideo Convention on the
Rights and Duties of States maintained that no state had the right to intervene in
the internal or external affairs of any other.
Comfort Ero & Suzanne Long, HumanitarianIntervention: A New Role for the UnitedNations?,
2 INT'L PEACEKEEPING 143 (1995).

41. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4.
42. Tania Voon, Legitimacy and Lawfulness of Humanitarian Intervention, in
INTERNATIONAL INTERVENTION, supra note 20, at 85 (citing Military & Paramilitary Activities
(Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27)).
43. U.N. Charter art. 51.
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of the peace, or act of aggression." Force used in the pursuit of
humanitarian purposes is therefore illegal.45
Through Article 2(7), the Charter also affirms that nothing in the
Charter "authorize[s] the United Nations to intervene in matters which are
essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state ... . This
prohibition is qualified, however, as its provisions do "not prejudice the
application of enforcement measures [by the Security Council] under
Chapter VII."' 47 Although there has been considerable debate over what
constitutes "intervention," it has long been held that an intervention must
be coercive to fall within the scope of 2(7) and that critical resolutions,
4 8 Taken together, 2(4) and 2(7) 41
standing alone, are not an "intervention.
"support the view that state sovereignty should preclude any intrusive
international action for the protection of human rights." 5°

44. U.N. Charter art. 39. The authorization ofthe Security Council to determine the existence
of a threat or breach of the peace or act of aggression and to make recommendations is found in
Chapter VII of the Charter. Bartraam S. Brown, Special Project:HumanitarianIntervention and
Kosovo: HumanitarianInterventionata Crossroads,41 WM. &MARYL. REV. 1683, 1688 (2000).
See also WALTER GARY SHARP, SR., U.N. PEACE OPERATIONS: A COLLECTION OF PRIMARY
DOCUMENTS AND READINGS GOVERNING THE CONDUCT OF MULTILATERAL PEACE OPERATIONS 105

(1995).
45. Louis Henkin, EditorialComment: NA TO's Kosovo Intervention: Kosovo and the Law
of "HumanitarianIntervention," 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 824 (1999).
46. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 7.
47. Id.
48. SHARP, supra note 44, at I11.
49. Even mainstream positivists advocating the maintenance of peace under a regime of
exclusive state sovereignty would concede that Article 2(7) is not what it used to be. A similar
provision in the Covenant of the League of Nations states that,
if the dispute between the parties is claimed by one of them, and is found by the
Council, to arise out of a matter which by international law is solely within the
domestic jurisdiction of that party, the Council shall so report, and shall make no
recommendation as to its settlement.
League of Nations Covenant art. 15, para. 6 (emphasis added). In the U.N. Charter, the term
"solely" has been replaced by the less robust "essentially." Peter Calvocoressi suggests that the
moral outrage with which the world held apartheid in southern Africa was one of the significant
events which "forced a breach in the conventional interpretation of article 2(7)" in the 1960s. Peter
Calvocoressi, A Problem and Its Dimensions, in TO LOOSE THE BANDS OF WICKEDNESS:
INTERNATIONAL INTERVENTION IN DEFENCE OF HUMAN RIGHTS 9 (Nigel Rodley ed., 1992)
[hereinafter To LOOSE THE BANDS OF WICKEDNESS].

50. Brown, supra note 44, at 1688. Apartheid did not threaten international peace and was
an "essentially domestic matter." The Security Council and the General Assembly, argues
Calvocoressi, agreed to discuss apartheid because "not to do so seemed an intolerable abdication
of responsibility." Id. This discussion led to action in the form of economic and cultural sanctions.
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By the same token, the Charter presents an antinomy by "herald[ing]
the emergence of a new international law of human rights that
fundamentally challenges the traditional concept of sovereignty."'"
Similarly, Thomas Franck, past President of the American Society of
International Law, has noted, "The U.N. Charter is, at once, a freeze-frame
of historically validated norms and also the foundation for a dynamic
political and administrative institution."52 The Charter's very first article
defines one of the four purposes of the United Nations to include,
"promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental
freedoms for all."53 Similarly, article 55 states that the United Nations shall
promote "universal respect for, and observance, of human rights."54 The
commitment to human rights was reinforced three years after the U.N.'s
founding with the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights.5 5 Moreover, as Peter Calvocoressi notes:
In the ensuing half-century a series of formal documents has
further defined humanitarian law, international human rights
law and the U.N.'s role in promoting them: international
humanitarian law applicable in armed conflict in the tradition
of the Geneva and Hague Conventions; human rights law
applicable in peace as well as war. The most notable
documents in the latter category, the two Covenants on Civil
and Political Rights and on Economic, Social, and Cultural
Rights, came into force in 1976. Moreover, the United
Nations, in adopting these Covenants, did not rest content
with their promulgation but charged the Human Rights
Committee with monitoring the implementation of the first of
them within member states by means of reports by states via
the Economic and Social Council to the General
Assembly .... 56

This antinomy seems to leave open the question as to when peace
operations may be employed in the protection of human rights. On one

51. Brown, supra note 44, at 1688-89.
52. Thomas Franck, Interpretationand Changein the Law ofHumanitarianIntervention, in
HUMANiTARIAN INTERVENTION, supra note 30, at 205.
53. U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 3.
54. U.N. Charter art. 55.
55. Calvocoressi, A Problem andIts Dimensions, in To LOOSE THE BANDS OF WICKEDNESS,
supra note 49, at 5. See generally Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N.
GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st plen. Mtg., U.N. Doc A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948).
56. Calvocoressi, A Problemand Its Dimensions, in To LOOSE THE BANDS OF WICKEDNESS,
supra note 49, at 5.
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side are members of the Security Council such as China and Russia, who
strongly resist any efforts to undermine a regime of exclusive state
sovereignty and nonintervention.57 On the other side, states such as Canada
and the Nordic countries, as well as the former Secretary-General Kofi
Annan, contend that the Charter's emphasis on state sovereignty and
nonintervention were never meant to govern a world in which the nature
of conflicts has shifted from inter to intra-state conflicts.58 Rather, such
proponents hold that the Charter is "a living document" and should be
dynamic and independent enough to change with the times.59
2. The Permissible Use of Force
Chapters VI and VII of the U.N. Charter provide the legal authority to
the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and

57. Michael C. Davis, The Emerging World Order,in INTERNATIONALINTERVENTION, supra
note 20, at 9.
58. The plethora of intra-state wars the world has witnessed since the end of the Cold War
are not anomalies, but rather an unfortunate staple of the post-Cold War world, despite the
predictions of some scholars to the contrary. See, e.g., Rotberg, supra note 11, at 99 ("[Tlhat
intrastate conflict is not apt to disappear in this millennium."). Contra Ted Robert Gurr, Ethnic
Warfare on the Wane, 79 FOREIGN AFF. 52-64 (2000).
59. According to Annan:
The Charter is a living document, whose high principles still define the aspirations
of peoples everywhere for lives of peace, dignity and development. Nothing in the
Charter precludes a recognition that there are rights beyond borders. Indeed, its
very letter and spirit are the affirmation of those fundamental human rights. In
short, it is not the deficiencies of the Charter which have brought us to this
juncture, but our difficulties in applying its principles to a new era; an era when
strictly traditional notions of sovereignty can no longer do justice to the
aspirations of peoples everywhere to attain their fundamental freedoms.
Secretary-General Kofi Annan, Secretary-General Presents his Annual Report to General
Assembly, Press Release SG/SM/7136 GA/9596 (Sept. 20, 1999), availableat http://www.un.org/
News/Press/docs/1999/19990920.sgsm7l36.html (last visited Oct. 26, 2006). The view of the
Charter as a living document is also expressed by Judge Alvarez's opinion in the Admission case:
The preparatory work on the constitution of the U.N. Organization is of but little
value. Moreover, the fact should be stressed that an institution, once established,
acquires a life of its own, independent of the elements which have given birth to
it, and it must develop, not in accordance with the views of those who created it,
but in accordance with the requirements of international life.
Brown, supra note 44, at 1707 (quoting Advisory Opinion on the Competence of the General
Assembly for the Admission of a State to the United Nations, 1950 I.C.J. 4, 68 (Mar. 3)).
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security. Chapter VI promotes the peaceful settlement of disputes. If
diplomacy or Chapter VI measures fail to maintain or restore international
peace or security, Chapter VII authorizes the Security Council to
determine a threat or breach of the peace 60 and decide what enforcement
measures to take in accordance with Articles 41 and 42.6 The dividing line
between the two Articles is the use of military force.62 Only Article 39
authorizes the use of armed force in order to "maintain or restore
international peace and security."6 3
3. The Use of Force in Peace Operations
In neither Chapter VI nor Chapter VII do the terms peacekeeping or
peace operations appear. The famous joke is that peacekeeping is
authorized by Chapter VI ' 2.6 Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjdld's
placing of peacekeeping at the interstices of VI and VII initially allowed
the United Nations to meet its lofty goals of maintaining peace and
security, but in time the blurring distinction would have tragic
consequences.65 In actuality, peacekeeping is much closer to Chapter VI's
procedures for conciliation than to Chapter Vi's enforcement. Indeed, as
Thomas Weiss, notes, "it [peacekeeping] is really an extrapolation of
Chapter VI rather than a would-be Chapter VII. Mathematically speaking,
peacekeeping should be '6.4,' so that observers would66 round downward
rather than upward in thinking about policy changes.,
The fundamental principles of traditional peacekeeping 67 include
consent (all parties must consent to the presence of the peacekeepers);

60. Since the founding of the United Nations, the notion of what constitutes a threat to the
peace has broadened significantly. See infra notes 93-100 and accompanying text.
61. SHARP, supra note 44, at 2.
62. Calvocoressi, A Problem andItsDimensions,in To LOOSE THE BANDS OF WICKEDNESS,
supranote 49, at 11.
63. U.N. Charter art. 39.
64. Wedgwood, supra note 7, at 70.
65. See, e.g., CHESTERMAN, supranote 15, at 102.
66. Thomas G. Weiss, Overcoming the Somalia Syndrome: "OperationRekindle Hope,"
Paper presented at the Experts Meeting on State Sovereignty, Human Rights and Humanitarian
Action(1995), availableathttp://www.ichrdd.ca/english/commdoc/publications/demDev/Somalia.
html#B13 (last visited Jan. 11, 2007).
67. The U.S. Army defines peacekeeping as "[m]ilitary operations, undertaken with the
consent of all major parties to a dispute, designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an
agreement (cease-fire, truce, or other such agreement) and support diplomatic efforts to reach a
long-term political settlement." U.S. ARMY TRAINING AND DOCTRINE COMMAND, supra note 9, at
I-l(c).
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impartiality and neutrality6 8 (forces must be impartial in the context of the
dispute); and limited use of force (peacekeepers will only use force in selfdefense).69 In addition to this "Trinity" of peacekeeping principles, the
Secretary-General exercises day-to-day control of the operation.7 ° In
essence, traditional peacekeepers are not so much responsible for making
peace as they are for monitoring a cease-fire which all parties have agreed
upon. 7 The United Nations has proven itself fully capable of conducting
traditional peacekeeping operations.72 Unfortunately, peacekeeping has a
limited role to play in an intra-state conflict in which the belligerents have
yet to come to the realization that they have more to lose by continuing
fighting than making peace.
In stark contrast to traditional peacekeeping, a Chapter VH peace
enforcement operation is based upon a finding by the Security Council of
a threat to international peace.7 3 Chapter VI does not apply, as there is
generally no peace agreement.74 Unlike traditional peacekeeping, success
depends not upon consent and impartiality, but on "a credible combat
capability that is commensurate with the level of consent pertaining to the
operation."75 The distinctions between peacekeeping and peace
enforcement operations are cogently illustrated by the graphic below (with
minor modifications) from Paragraph 312 of the British Military
Publication Joint Warfare Program.76

68. Although often used synonymously, Marc Weller notes that, in the humanitarian context,
the two terms are more like overlapping principles. According to Weller, neutrality is defined as
a principle of abstention in which a third party must not undertake activities which would assist the
war effort of any party. Id. Impartiality on the other hand is a principle of action in which certain
standards developed by a third party are applied equally to all parties to the conflict. See Marc
Weller, The RelativityofHumanitarianNeutralityandlmpartiality,J.HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE
(2000), availableat http://www.jha.ac/articles/a029.htm (last visited Oct. 26, 2006).
69. Claus Heje, UnitedNationsPeacekeeping,in A FUTURE FOR PEACEKEEPING 15 (Edward
Moxon-Browne ed., 1990).
70. UNITED KINGDOM MINISTRY OF DEFENSE, JOINT WARFARE PUBLICATION 3-50, THE
MILrrARY CONTRIBUTION TO PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS 1-4 (2d ed. 2004).
71. SRARP, supra note 44, at471.
72. See, e.g., Weiss, supranote 66.
73. Michael O'Connor, Policingthe Peace,in UNITEDNATIONS PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS:
AD HOC MISSIONS, PERMANENT ENGAGEMENT 60-61 (Albrtecht Schnabel & Ramesh Thakur eds.,
2001) [hereinafter U.N. PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS].
74. Vera Hayes, Establishingthe Credibilityofa RegionalPeacekeepingCapability,in U.N.
PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS, supra note 73, at 130.
75. Id. at 131.
76. Id.at 131-32 (quoting UNITED KINGDOM MINISTRY OF DEFENSE, supra note 70).
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The horizontal line represents capability and increases as it goes from
left to right. The vertical line represents consent and increases as it goes
from bottom to top. A traditional peacekeeping operation can be conducted
with low capability provided that the level of consent is high (quadrant
one). In quadrant three, consent would appear to be high but is assessed as
uncertain or fragile. In such a scenario, a peacekeeping force should
deploy prepared for peace enforcement. In quadrant four, consent for the
operation is not forthcoming but the force has a high enough capability to
conduct a peace operation. In quadrant two, consent for the operation is
below the critical level necessary to conduct peacekeeping and the force
does not have the capability to operate against concerted opposition and
achieve its objectives. In this quadrant, a peacekeeping force will lose
credibility and the operation becomes untenable. In the 1990s, the United
Nations spent an awful lot of time in quadrant two.
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C. The Post-Cold World War Assault on Sovereignty
1. A New World Order
The end of the Cold War reinvigorated the United Nations. 7 With the
fall of the Soviet Union, a paralyzing distrust which had rendered the
Security Council impotent 78 was, for a short term, replaced with goodwill
and cooperation. In the words of Secretary-General Boutros BoutrosGhali, the United Nations had been given "a second chance to create the
world of our Charter., 79 With the stunning success of the U.S.-led coalition
against Iraqi aggression, even President Bush the elder, a cautious man not
generally given to hyperbole, heralded "a new world order."8 ° In proving

77. On the flip side, the end of the Cold War has had the negative consequence of unleashing
ethnic and religious rivalries. As the Superpower rivalry came to an end, states began to implode
in the absence of the pressure that had held them together. See generally Weiss, supra note 66.
78. During the Cold War, 279 vetoes were cast in the Security Council. An Agendafor Peace,
supra note 29, 14. One method by which the United States sought to circumvent Soviet vetoes
during the Cold War was the 1950 GA Resolution 377, also known as the "Uniting for Peace"
Resolution. Resolution 377 provides that "if the Security Council, because of lack of unanimity of
the permanent members, fails to exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance of
international peace and security ... the General Assembly shall consider the matter immediately
with a view to making appropriate recommendations to Members for collective measures." Uniting
for Peace, G.A. Res. 377 (V), at A(I), U.N. Doc. A/377 (Nov. 3, 1950). Resolution 377 was first
used by the United States to pressure Britain and France to withdraw from the Suez during the crisis
in 1956. Id. The United States next used 377 to pressure the Soviet Union to cease its intervention
in Hungary in 1956. See Michael Ratner & Jules Lobel, A. U.N. Alternative to War: Unitingfor
Peace, available at http://www.lawyersagainstthewar.org/letters/opedletter.pdf (last visited Nov.
19, 2006). In time, however, many nonaligned countries came to view Resolution 377 as an
American effort of transforming the United Nations into a larger edition of the Atlantic Pact, and
would have nothing to do with it. LARRY L. FABIAN, SOLDIERS WITHOUT ENEMIES 64 (1971).
79. An Agenda for Peace,supra note 29, 75, June 17, 1992. Similarly, in January 1992,
commenting on the anticipation of fulfilling the Security Council's potential, Prime Minister Major,
the President of the Security Council, noted:
[T]here are new favourable international circumstances under which the Security
Council has begun to fulfill more effectively its primary responsibility for the
maintenance of international peace and security .... The ending of the Cold War
has raised hopes for a safer, more equitable and more humane world.
Note by the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/23500 (Jan. 31, 1992) [hereinafter Doc.
S/23500].
80. Ivo H. Daalder, The UnitedStates and Military Intervention in InternalConflict, in THE
INTERNATIONAL DIMENSIONS OF INTERNAL CONFLICT 461 (Michael E. Brown ed., 1996). In an
address to Congress on March 6, 1991, President George H.W. Bush declared:
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that this was not simply empty rhetoric, in April 1991, President Bush
authorized Operation Provide Comfort, a relief and protection operation
for Kurds. The operation, and the SC Resolution on which it was based,
would have far-reaching implications for "Westphalian sovereignty."
In the immediate aftermath of the Gulf War, thousands of Kurds,
fearful of the Iraqi regime, attempted to flee Iraq to the north." Due to
political concerns, Turkish officials refused to allow them permission to
cross into Turkey. 82 A human tragedy on a massive scale resulted, with
thousands of Kurds being trapped in barren northern Iraq, vulnerable to
Saddam's forces and without access to water, food, or medical supplies."
In less than 48 hours, cargo and fighter aircraft were re-deployed to bases
84
in southern Turkey where they began delivering humanitarian supplies.
Over the next several weeks, a U.S.-led coalition force was deployed into
northern Iraq and two no-fly zones were imposed over southern and
northern Iraq by the United States, Britain, and France.8 ' This was a clear
violation of Iraqi sovereignty, leading one scholar to remark that it was "a
curious situation where those who,just months earlier, took forceful action
to uphold the sanctity of state sovereignty, were undermining that same
concept."86 The United States, Britain, and France argued that the no-fly
zones were legally justified pursuant to Security Council Resolution 688,
which stated in part, "[t]he Security Council condemns the repression of
the Iraqi civilian population in many parts of Iraq, including most recently

Now, we can see a new world coming into view. A world in which there is the
very real prospect of a new world order. In the words of Winston Churchill, a
"world order" in which "the principles ofjustice and fair play... protect the weak
against the strong..." A world where the United Nations, freed from cold war
stalemate, is poised to fulfill the historic vision of its founders. A world in which
freedom and respect for human rights find a home among all nations.
President George Bush, Address to Congress (Mar. 6, 1991), availableat http://www.jmcc.org/
documents/bushgulf.htm (last visited Jan. 12, 2007).
81. Daalder, supra note 80, at 461. To a lesser extent, Shi'ites in the south fled toward
Kuwait. Lawrence Freedman & David Boren, "Safe Havens "for Kurds in Post-War Iraq, in To
LOOSE THE BANDS OF WICKEDNESS, supra note 49, at 43.
82. See Global Security.org, Operation Provide Comfort, at http://www.globalsecurity.org/
military/ops/providecomfort.htm (last visited Oct. 26, 2006).
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.See also No-Fly Zones: the Legal Position,BBC NEWS, Feb. 19, 2001, availableat
http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/world/middleeast/I 175950.stm (last visited Oct. 26, 2006).
86. Kurt Mills, Sovereignty Eclipsed?" The Legitimacy of Humanitarian Access and
Intervention, J. HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE (1997), at http://www.jha.ac/articles/a019.htm (last
visited Oct. 26, 2006).
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in Kurdish populated areas, the consequences of which threaten
international peace and security in the region."87
Here was a direct assault on the concept of"Westphalian sovereignty."
Indeed, Philip Alston has suggested that Resolution 688 represented a
watershed in the Security Council's handling of human rights.88 Other
authors acknowledge the precedent-setting nature of 688 while noting that
the circumstances under which the intervention took place were unique
and unlikely to furnish evidence that humanitarian intervention would be
allowed under customary international law in the future. 9
The allies attempted to close Pandora's box by stretching their
interpretations of sovereignty in international law. Nonetheless, the
Rubicon was crossed on April 12, 1991, when British Foreign Secretary
Douglas Hurd stated that "the division between internal and external
policies of a nation is 'not absolute."' 9° Thomas Pickering, the U.S.
Ambassador to the United Nations acknowledged that the United Nations
was entering unchartered waters:
The response to the plight of the Kurds suggests a shift in
world opinion towards a re-balancing of the claims of
sovereignty and those of extreme humanitarian need. This is
good news since it means we are moving closer to deterring
genocide and aiding its victims. However, it also means we
have much careful thinking to do about the nature of, and the
limitations upon, intervention to carry out humanitarian
assistance programs where States refuse, in pursuit of
"policies of repression," to give permission to such
assistance. 9'

87. S.C. Res. 688, U.N. SCOR 46th Sess., 298d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/688 (1991). SC
Resolution 688 did not specifically authorize this use of force. Indeed, no Security Council
Resolution ever mentioned the no-fly zones. Brown, supra 44, at 1705.
88. Philip Alston, The Security Council andHuman Rights: Lessons to Be Learnedfrom the
Iraq-Kuwait Crisisand its Aftermath, 13 AuSTRL. Y.B. OF INT'L L. 107, 116 (1992).
89. See Freedman & Boren, "Safe Havens "for Kurds in Post-WarIraq, in To LOOSE THE
BANDS OF WICKEDNESS, supra note 49, at 82 ("It was an important precedent but the circumstances
were exceptional and the long-term impact of the action was mixed.").
90. Id. at 81-82.
91. Id. at 82.
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2. An Ever-Expanding "Threat to the Peace"
Since Resolution 688, an important trend in Security Council
resolutions has developed.92 On the most fundamental level, massive
human rights violations and internal strife have come to be accepted as
threats to international peace and security, potentially triggering Chapter
VII enforcement measures. 93 Indeed, in the 1990s, "threats to the peace"
were expanded to include serious humanitarian crises (Somalia,94 the
Congo, 95 Kosov0 96); restoration of internal peace and security (East
Timor 97 and Albania 98); genocide (Rwanda 99); and a high-water mark of
Security Council activism in the restoration of democracy (Haiti). 00

92. See Guglielmo Verdirame, Testing the Effectiveness of International Norms: U.N.
HumanitarianAssistance and Sexual Apartheid in Afghanistan, 23 HUM. RTS. Q. 733, 750-51
(2001); WEISS, supra note 39, at 197.
93. See, e.g., Doc. S/23500, supra note 79 (pledging that a broader range of circumstances
could be considered threats under Chapter VII); WEISS, supra note 39, at 197.
94. S.C. Res. 794, U.N. SCOR, 3145th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/794 (Dec. 3, 1992).
95. S.C. Res. 1080, U.N. SCOR, 3713th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1080 (Nov. 15, 1996).
96. S.C. Res. 1203, U.N. SCOR, 3937th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1203 (Oct. 24, 1998).
97. S.C. Res. 1264, U.N. SCOR, 4045th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1264 (Sept. 15, 1999).
98. S.C. Res. 1114, U.N. SCOR, 3791st mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/I 114 (June 19, 1997).
99. S.C. Res. 929, U.N. SCOR, 3392d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/929 (June 22, 1994).
100. S.C. Res. 875, U.N. SCOR, 3293d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/875 (Oct. 16, 1993) ("[I]n
these unique and exceptional circumstances, the failure of the military authorities in Haiti to fulfil
their obligations under the Agreement constitutes a threat to peace and security in the region."). The
significance of the overthrow of Father Jean-Bertrand Aristide, the first freely elected president in
the history of Haiti, on September 30, 1991 and Security Council Resolution 875 cannot be
overemphasized. See generally Domingo E. Acevedo, The Haitian Crisisand the OAS Response:
A Test of Effectiveness in Protecting Democracy, in ENFORCING RESTRAINT: COLLECTIVE
INTERVENTION IN INTERNAL CONFLICTS 119 (Lori Fisler Damrosch ed., 1993). Although democracy
had been established within the Organization of American States (OAS) as an important regional
norm, an authorization calling for the use of force to remove an undemocratic regime was truly
revolutionary. WEISS, supra note 39, at 198. Some scholars have argued that SC Resolution 875
heralded the emergence of a norm of intervention in support of democracy. See, e.g., id. Such a
norm is already having far-reaching consequences for the African continent. African scholar Jeremy
Levitt for example discusses the 1997 Inter-African Force to Monitor the Implementation of the
Bangui Agreements (MISAB) intervention in the Central African Republic (CAR) following the
overthrow of President Patasse's democratically elected regime. See Jeremy Levitt, African
Interventionist States and InternationalLaw, in AFRICAN INTERVENTIONIST STATES 35 (Oliver
Furley & Roy May eds., 2001). See also S.C. Res. 1125, U.N. SCOR, 3808th mtg., U.N. Doc.
S/RES/i 125 (Aug. 6, 1997) (holding that the situation in CAR was a threat to international peace
and security and authorizing MISAB to ensure the security of its personnel and restore peace and
security to CAR in accordance with the Bangui Agreements). In light of MISAB, Levitt concludes:
The international community including African states has . . . evaluated the
principle of democracy to the category of a rule which is fully enforceable through
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3. Crossing the Rubicon in Kosovo
The terrible events of Kosovo in 1998-1999 have been well
documented.'' When NATO undertook a bombing campaign in 1999
designed to compel Serbian compliance with the introduction of an
international peacekeeping force, neither of the exceptions to the Article
2(4) prohibition existed.0 2 First, while the Security Council had found that
the situation in Kosovo constituted a threat to peace and security in the
region, the use of force was never authorized.0 3 Indeed, Security Council
authorization was never sought; and for good reason."° Second, self-

appropriate regional collective mechanisms. In this sense, international law
recognizes [sic] a right to democratic governance and appears to place it on
similar but not equal footing as the human rights protective regime. Hence,it
appears that when undemocratic and violent means are used to unseat a
democratic government against the will of the civilian population and when such
an unseating threatens the stability of the state and the security of the said
populace, states may invoke a pro-democratic right of intervention. While in
theory, Western nations purport to have the strongest democratic traditions, in
practice, this emerging norm is taking firmer root in Africa than in any other
region.
Levitt, supra,at 34-35 (internal citations omitted). For a fascinating discussion of whether African
countries which are "endogenously coup-prone" can be made relatively "coup-proof' through their
participation in regional peace operations, see Ali A. Mazrui, Foreword,in THE CAUSES OF WAR
AND THE CONSEQUENCES OF PEACEKEEPING IN AFRICA, at xvii (Ricardo Rend Laremont ed., 2002).
101. See generally GREG CAMPBELL: THE ROAD TO KOSOvO: A BALKAN DIARY (1998), TIM
JUDAH, KoSovo: WAR AND REVENGE (2002), JULIE MERTUS, KoSovO: How MYTHS AND TRUTHS
STARTED A WAR (1999), NOEL MALCOLM, Kosovo: A SHORT HISTORY (1999).
102. See supra Part II.B.1.
103. See S.C. Res. 1203, U.N. SCOR, 3937th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1203 (Oct. 24, 1998)
("Affirming that the unresolved situation in Kosovo, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, constitutes
a continuing threat to peace and security in the region" yet merely "[c]all[ing] for prompt and
complete investigation, including international supervision and participation, of all atrocities
committed against civilians and full cooperation with the International Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia, including compliance with its orders, requests for information and investigations.").
104. Under Article 27(3) of the Charter, any of the Security Council's five permanent
members may veto decisions of the Security Council and NATO members had reasonable belief
to assume that both Russia and China would have vetoed a resolution authorizing the use of force
had they been given the opportunity. Indeed, two days after the bombing began, a draft resolution
tabled by Russia calling for the cessation of the use of force was defeated by twelve votes to three
(Russia, China, andNamibia). U.N. Doc. S/1999/328, Belarus, India, and Russian Federation: Draft
Resolution (Mar. 26, 1999). Nevertheless, the defeat of the resolution cannot be regarded as
constituting the positive authorization required by the Charter. Michael Byers & Simon
Chesterman, Changingthe Rules about Rules, in HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION, supra note 30,
at 182. While few states opposing the draft resolution gave any legal basis for the action, the United
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defense could not be sustained as ajustification as there was no suggestion
that Yugoslavia was planning to attack a NATO member. Nor were the
Kosovar Albanians capable of inviting assistance as Kosovo was not a
state. °5 The NATO intervention was consequently illegal. The more
interesting question is whether it was legitimate." 6 This is the dilemma
grappled with by the 2000 Independent International Commission on
Kosovo. 1°7 The Commission ultimately concluded that while illegal, the
intervention was legitimate and therefore called for reforms to "address the
growing gap between legality and legitimacy that always arises in cases of
Kingdom reiterated its justification given in support of Operation Provide Comfort and the no-fly
zones in Iraq, arguing that military intervention was justified in exceptional circumstances to
prevent humanitarian catastrophes. WEISS, supranote 39, at 146. NATO Secretary-General Javier
Solana suggested that the NATO action was legal as it was "'within the logic of the U.N. Security
Council' [an attempt one scholar dismisses as trying to claim Security Council authorization] where
none actually existed." Brown, supranote 44, at 1706. As was the case in the debate over the 2003
use of force in Iraq, Prime Minister Blair was the strongest proponent in conceptualizing the
operation in terms of a moral rationale:
There are real strategic interests at stake in the Balkans .... But I believe that a
real sense of moral purpose is also motivating NATO. We either allow ethnic
cleansing to succeed, or we say that the world community has an obligation to stop
this most violent form of nationalism. Our job is to go in there and reverse it and
defeat it.... Just as globalization is opening up the world's financial architecture
for discussion, reevaluation and improvement, so we are being forced to confront
the fact there is an international community, and inevitably there are conflicts that
arise. You can't intervene everywhere. There are places you can't intervene at all.
But I believe it is right that when we have the capability to make a difference that
we do.
Jim Hoagland, Tony Blair'sInitiation,WASH. POST, Apr. 18, 1999, at B07.
105. Byers & Chesterman, Changing the Rules about Rules, in HUMANITARIAN
INTERVENTION, supra note 30, at 182.
106. Jane Stromseth has referred to actions which are technically illegal yet legitimate as the
"excusable breach" approach to humanitarian intervention. See Jane Stromseth, Rethinking
HumanitarianIntervention, in HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION, supranote 30, at 243. According
to Stromseth, such an approach violates the Charter, yet states would be unlikely to be condemned
or punished. Id.The benefits to such a rule is that it allows a "safety valve" in truly extenuating
circumstances while not contemplating any new legal rules governing the use of force. Id. at 24344. On the other hand, Stromseth acknowledges that it is "unsatisfying to label as 'illegal' action
that the majority of the U.N. Security Council views as morally and politicallyjustified." Id.at 244.
Moreover, "[i]f such situations were to recur, the tension between legality and legitimacy would
yield problems over time." Id.
107. The Independent International Commission on Kosovo was created on the initiative of
Swedish Prime Minister Goran Persson, Justice Richard Goldstone of South Africa, and Mr. Carl
Tham, Secretary-General of the Olof Palme International Center in Stockholm. See INDEP. INT'L
COMM'N ON Kosovo, THE Kosovo REPORT (2000).
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humanitarian intervention" and offered its own framework for
humanitarian intervention.'0 8 One such reform, suggested by Louis
Henkin, would be a "gentlemen's agreement" amongst the P5 not to veto
operations as regards humanitarian intervention."109
Kosovo clearly raises more questions than it answers. While acting
ultra vires of the Security Council should not be encouraged, there should
be a narrowly defined set of circumstances in which peace operations may
be legal, even without the Security Council's authorization. In his 1999
address to the General Assembly, Kofi Annan plaintively asked:
To those for whom the greatest threat to the future of
international order is the use of force in the absence of a
Security Council mandate, one might ask-not in the context
of Kosovo-but in the context of Rwanda: If, in those dark
days and hours leading up to the genocide, a coalition of
States had been prepared to act in defence [sic] of the Tutsi
population, but did not receive prompt Council authorization,
should such a coalition have stood aside and allowed the
horror to unfold?" 0
Thomas Weiss eloquently responds, "The answer, by any of the 800,000
slaughtered Rwandans, would be obvious, even if among many U.N. legal
and political commentators it often remains unclear.'' 1..

108. Id. intro. The Commission's framework includes three threshold principles which would
have to be satisfied in order to justify humanitarian intervention. The Kosovo Report explains:
"These principles include the suffering of civilians owing to severe patterns of human rights
violations or the breakdown of government, the overriding commitment to the direct protection of
the civilian population, and the calculation that the intervention has a reasonable chance of ending
the humanitarian catastrophe." Id. Executive Summary: The Future of Humanitarian Intervention.
In terms of the framework's enforceability, the Commission suggests:
It is our hope that the U.N. General Assembly could adopt such a framework in
some modified form as a Declaration and that the U.N. Charter be adapted to this
Declaration either by appropriate amendments or by a case-by-case approach in
the U.N. Security Council. We also suggest a strengthening of the level of human
rights protection contained in the U.N. Charter-aware of course of the political
problems of implementing such a change.
Id.
109. Henkin, supra note 45, at 827-28.
110. Secretary-General Kofi Annan, Report to the General Assembly, Sept. 20, 1999,
availableat http://www.globalpolicy.org/secgen/sg-ga.htm (last visited Oct. 26, 2006).
111. WEISS, supranote 39, at 214.
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In recent years, one of the most significant efforts aimed at bridging the
gap between the "Two Sovereignties" has been the 2001 report entitled
The Responsibility to Protect by the International Commission on
Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS). As was true of the 1997

Ottawa Convention banning anti-personnel landmines, the impetus for the
ICISS was the Canadian government. In response to pleas by the
Independent International Commission on Kosovo and the Secretary-

General to build an international consensus on humanitarian intervention,
in September 2000, Canadian Prime Minister Jean Chrdtien announced the
establishment of an independent international commission on Intervention
and State Sovereignty. 13
' Working at break-neck speed, the twelve member
Commission" 4 published The Responsibilityto Protectin December 2001

112. Francis Deng, the U.N. Secretary-General's special representative for internally displaced
persons (IDPs), is credited with the phrase. Essentially, state authorities have a "responsibility to
protect" their citizens when they are threatened. If unable or unwilling to do so, the state must
accept assistance from those who can and its sovereignty is essentially suspended. See FRANCIS
DENG ET AL., SOVEREIGNTY AS RESPONSIBILITY: CONFLICT MANAGEMENT IN AFRICA (1996). Just
two years later, Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali had latched onto the concept. In a 1998
Report, the Secretary-General stated:
While full respect must be shown for the sovereignty, independence and territorial
integrity of the States concerned, where States are unable or unwilling to meet
their responsibilities towards refugees and others in conflict situations, the
international community should ensure that victims receive the assistance and
protection they need to safeguard their lives.
Secretary-General Boutros Broutros-Ghali, Report of the Secretary-Generalon Protectionfor
HumanitarianAssistance to Refugees and Others in ConflictSituations, 16 U.N. Doc. S/1998/883
(Sept. 22, 1998).
113. Int'l Comm'n on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to Protect, app.
B (2001) [hereinafter ICISS Report], availableat http://www.iciss.ca/menu-en.asp (last visited Oct.
26,2006). The Commission was launched on September 14,2000, by then Foreign Minister Lloyd
Axworthy with the mandate of "promot[ing] a comprehensive debate on the issues, and to foster
global political consensus on how to move from polemics, and often paralysis, towards action
within the international system, particularly through the United Nations." Id.
114. The Commission included Gareth Evans (Australia), Co-Chair; Mohamed Sahnoun
(Algeria) Co-Chair; Gisrle Ct&Harper (Canada); Lee Hamilton (United States); Michael Ignatieff
(Canada); Vladimir Lukin (Russia); Klaus Naumann (Germany); Cyril Ramaphosa (South Africa);
Fidel V. Ramos (Philippines); Comelio Sommaruga (Switzerland); Eduardo Stein Barillas
(Guatemala); Ramesh Thakur (India). Id. app. A.
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The real value of the Responsibility to Protect is the refreshing
approach it takes to the "Two Sovereignties" dilemma." 5 Unlike other
scholarly tomes advocating for the right to intervene, the ICISS16
disarmingly states that it seeks to strengthen the sovereignty of states.'
Simultaneously, it seeks to improve the capacity of the international
community to react decisively when states are either unable or unwilling
to protect their own people. 1 7 The ICISS seeks to accomplish these two
seemingly incompatible objectives by shifting the emphasis from
"sovereignty as control to sovereignty as responsibility."' 18 The ICISS

115. Anthony Lewis, the former New York Times columnist, has "describe[d] the ICISS's
approach as capturing 'the international state of mind."' WEISS, supra note 39, at 21 (quoting
Anthony Lewis, The Challenge of Global Justice Now, 132 DAEDuLUS 8 (2003)).
116. ICISS Report, supranote 113, at 8.31.
117. Thomas Weiss notes that the ICISS set the bar for human suffering ... high." WEISS,
supranote 39, at 23. The "Just Cause Threshold" of the Report explains:
Military intervention for human protection purposes is an exceptional and
extraordinary measure. To be warranted, there must be serious and irreparable
harm occurring to human beings, or imminently likely to occur, of the following
kind:
A. large scale loss of life, actual or apprehended, with genocidal intent or not,
which is the product either of deliberate state action, or state neglect or inability
to act, or a failed state situation; or
B. large scale 'ethnic cleansing', actual or apprehended, whether carried out by
killing, forced expulsion, acts of terror or rape.
ICISS Report, supra note 113, at xii. The report also delineates four "precautionary principles"
based on a Just War theory:
A. Right intention: The primary purpose of the intervention, whatever other
motives intervening states may have, must be to halt or avert human suffering.
Right intention is better assured with multilateral operations, clearly supported by
regional opinion and the victims concerned.
B. Last resort: Military intervention can only be justified when every non-military
option for the prevention or peaceful resolution of the crisis has been explored,
with reasonable rounds for believing lesser measures would not have succeeded.
C. Proportional means: The scale, duration and intensity of the planned military
intervention should be the minimum necessary to secure the defined human
protection objective.
D. Reasonable prospects: There must be a reasonable chance of success in halting
or averting the suffering which has justified the intervention, with the
consequences of action not likely to be worse than the consequences of inaction.
Id. at xii.
118. ICISS Report, supra note 113, at 2.14. The Report begins with two basic assumptions:
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believes that "by elevating the responsibility to protect and deemphasizing the permissibility of intervention, the objectionable quality
of humanitarian intervention may be reduced," at least enough for the
Chinese, Russians, and many Third World leaders to accept some of its
recommendations. '19
The ICISS recognizes that there are likely to be more Kosovos;
instances when the U.N. Security Council is paralyzed by the veto power
of one or more of the P5. In such cases, the ICISS suggests that the P5
pledge not to vote against a majority of the Security Council unless vital
interests of one of the parties is at stake (for example Russia's interest in
the world community intervening in Chechnya). 2 ° In the event that this
fails, the ICISS suggests that a regional response may be legitimate,
provided that it has first sought and failed to secure U.N. Security Council
approval. 121

A.
B.

State sovereignty implies responsibility, and the primary responsibility for
the Protection of its people lies with the state itself.
Where a population is suffering serious harm, as a result of internal war,
insurgency, repression or state failure and the state in question is unwilling
or unable to halt or avert it, the principle of non-intervention yields to the
international responsibility to protect.

Id. at xi.
119. See Davis, The Emerging World Order, in INTERNATIONAL INTERVENTION, supra note
20, at 12; WEISS, supra note 39, at 22-23.
120. See Principles for Military Intervention 3D:
The Permanent Five members of the Security Council should agree not to apply
their veto power, in matters where their vital state interests are not involved, to
obstruct the passage of resolutions authorizing military intervention for human
protection purposes for which there is otherwise majority support.
ICISS Report, supra note 113, at xiii.
121. See Principles for Military Intervention 3E:
If the Security Council rejects a proposal or fails to deal with it in a reasonable
time, alternative options are: I. Consideration of the matter by the General
Assembly in Emergency Special Session under the "Uniting for Peace" procedure;
and II. Action within area ofjurisdiction by regional or sub-regional organizations
under Chapter VIII of the Charter, subject to their seeking subsequent
authorization from the Security Council.
Id. at xiii. The ICISS goes on to warn the Security Council of the effects of inaction:
The Security Council should take into account in all its deliberations that, if it fails
to discharge its responsibility to protect in conscience-shocking situations crying,
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A criticism leveled at the ICISS is it did not go far enough. As Thomas
Weiss notes, the conditions triggering humanitarian intervention under the
ICISS framework (large scale loss of life and large scale ethnic cleansing)
set the bar for human suffering fairly "high.' 2 He notes that two other
conditions (the overthrow of a democratically elected government and
wide-scale human rights violations) were cut by the ICCIS as threshold
conditions.121 While liberal interventionists surely would have liked to
have seen these two conditions added, the ICISS realized that would have
made the report more unattractive to its target audience (i.e., the Russians,
the Chinese, and proponents of "Westphalian Sovereignty)."
The ICISS gives the primary role of authorizing peace operations to the
Security Council. 24 As such, the Security Council is the first stop to
authorize humanitarian intervention. 2 The report's importance, however,
is its advocacy that the Security Council need not be the last.
Quite remarkably, in 2005, the concept underpinning the Responsibility
to Protect-the right of humanitarian intervention-was officially
26
endorsed by the U.N. General Assembly at the 2005 World Summit.1
Echoing the ICISS's 2001 report, in General Assembly Resolution 60,
Member States declared that:
The International Community .... has the responsibility to use
appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means, in
accordance with Chapters VI and VIII of the Charter, to help to
protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and
crimes against humanity. In this context, we are prepared to take
collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the
Security Council, in accordance with the Charter, including Chapter
out for action, concerned states may not rule out other means to meet the gravity
and urgency of that situation-and that the stature and credibility of the United
Nations may suffer thereby.
Id.
122. WEISS, supra note 39, at 197.

123. Id.
124. See Principles for Military Intervention, 3A ("There is no better or more appropriate body
than the [United Nations] Security Council to deal with military intervention issues for human
protection purposes.... The task is not to find alternatives to the Security Council as a source of
authority, but to make the Security Council work much better than it has." ICISS Report, supra note
113, at xii.).
125. WEISS, supra note 39, at 214.

126. See generally 2005 World Summit, Sept. 14-16, 2005, High-Level Plenary Meeting of
the 60th Session of the GeneralAssembly, http://www.un.org/summit2005 (last visited Oct. 26,
2006).
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VII, on a case-by-case basis and in cooperation with relevant
regional organizations as appropriate, should peaceful means be
inadequate and national authorities are manifestly failing to protect
their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and
crimes against humanity.... 27
A year later, in the debate over authorization to send U.N. peacekeepers
to Darfur, Sudan, and to relieve the beleaguered African Union force there,
despite Sudanese objections, the Secretary-General remarked:
[I]n September, in a historic first, U.N. members unanimously
accepted the responsibility to protect populations from genocide,
ethnic cleansing, war crimes and crimes against humanity, pledging
to take action through the Security Council when national
authorities fail.' 28
The world community should certainly be applauded for such lofty
edicts. Nevertheless, the question remains whether such pronouncements
will in the future galvanize international advocacy in the face of crimes
against humanity or merely represent empty rhetoric. If Darfur is any
indication, GA Res. 60/1 is tragically the latter.'29
Il. THE EVOLUTION OF PEACE OPERATIONS
Peacekeeping is not a job for soldiers, but only a soldier can do it. 3 °
Dag Hammarskj6ld
A. TraditionalPeacekeepingDuringthe Cold War
"The Cold War served to limit both the number and scope of U.N.
peace operations.' 3 1 In the main, the peace operations conducted prior to

127. G.A. Res. 60/1, 139, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/1 (Oct. 24, 2005).
128. See Eric Reeves, Darfur: An Abject Abandonment of the "Responsibility to Protect,"
VOICE OF SUDAN, July 4, 2006, http://voiceofsudan.com/index.php?op=ViewArticle&articleld =
108&blogld=l (last visited Oct. 26, 2006).
129. See infra notes 392-93.
130. HEADQUARTERS, DEP'T OF THE ARMY, PEACE OPERATIONS, FM 100-23, 1 (1994).
131. As Boutros Boutros-Ghali notes in his Supplement to an Agendafor Peace:
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the end of the Cold War are today known as "traditional peacekeeping."' 32
Today, not only are there more operations undertaken under the authority
of the United Nations and coalitions of the willing, 133 but those operations
are markedly more complex, tending to take a holistic approach to
conflict. 134 3As
such, they are considered "multidimensional" peace
5
operations. 1
Traditional peacekeeping missions can be traced to the creation of the
United Nations. 136 According to the U.N. Department of Peacekeeping
Operations (DPKO), UNTSO (U.N. Truce Supervision Organization) was
the first peacekeeping operation established by the United Nations. Fiftynine years later, and with an annual budget of 29 million dollars, 151
uniformed personnel (129 troops and 22 military observers) remain in the

It is indisputable that since the end of the cold war there has been a dramatic
increase in the United Nations activities related to the maintenance of peace and
security.... The end of the Cold War removed constraints that had inhibited
conflict in the former Soviet Union and elsewhere. As a result there has been a
rash of wars within newly independent States, often of a religious or ethnic
character and often involving unusual violence and cruelty. The end of the Cold
War seems also to have contributed to an outbreak of such wars in Africa. In
addition, some of the proxy wars fuelled by the cold war within States remain
unresolved. Inter-state wars, by contrast, have become infrequent.
Supplement to Agenda for Peace, supra note 7, 8, 10.
132. Heje, supranote 69, at 1.
133. The proliferation of operations in the post-Cold War is due to three factors in particular.
First, there are simply more conflicts today than during the Cold War. In 2004 there were nineteen
major armed conflicts, five of which were fought in Asia; five of which were fought in Africa. Id.
All the conflicts were intra-state (including Iraq) although in three conflicts external states
contributed troops. See STOCKHOLM INT'LPEACE RESEARCH INST., 2005 YEARBOOK: ARMAMENTS,
DISARMAMENT AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, app. 2A (2005). Second, consent for peace
operations is easier to obtain. Third, today's public is better informed and more willing to press its
government to "do something" (the so-called "CNN effect."). See, e.g., PIERS ROBINSON, THE
MYTH CNN EFFECT: THE MYTH OF NEWS MEDIA, FOREIGN POLICY AND INTERVENTION (2002)
(defining the CNN effect as the saturation of western viewers with nonstop, real time news footage
from civil wars, which constitute a powerful plea for action).
134. See, e.g., infra note 181.
135. For the purposes of this Article, "multidimensional peacekeeping" is synonymous with
"second-generation peacekeeping." As P.C. Wood and D.S. Sorenson explain: "The concept of
peacekeeping expanded [in the post-Cold War] to include Peacemaking, peace building, and peace
enforcement operations--often designated 'second-generation' PKOs because they include
military, political, social and humanitarian aspects seldom present in traditional PKOs." Pia
Christina Wood & David S. Sorenson, Introduction, in THE POLITICS OF PEACEKEEPING IN THE
POST-COLD WAR ERA 3 (David S. Sorenson & Pia Christina Wood eds., 2005).
136. ESREF AKSu, THE UNITED NATIONS, INTRA-STATE PEACEKEEPING AND NORMATIVE
CHANGE 76 (2003).
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Middle East to "monitor ceasefires, supervise armistice agreements,
prevent isolated incidents from escalating and assisting other U.N.
137
peacekeeping operations in the region.
Nevertheless, the notion of peacekeeping did not fully emerge until the
1956 Suez Crisis when the United Kingdom, France, and Israel invaded
Egypt. The Canadian diplomat, Lester Pearson, proposed the resolution
which created a U.N. Emergency Force (UNEF 1)and Secretary-General
Hammarskj6ld provided the theoretical underpinnings.'
UNEF I
permitted the invading nations to withdraw with a minimum loss of face
and acted as a buffer between the Egyptians and the Israelis until June
1967, when Egypt compelled UNEF I to depart. 139 Simon Chesterman
notes that at various times Canadian Major-General E.L. Bums, the UNEF
I Force Commander, attempted to reinterpret UNEF I's mandate so as to
deter violations of the ceasefire.' 40 As Chesterman explains, "[h]e appears
to have been genuinely surprised when his requests for a force robust
enough to pose a deterrent threat to the parties was refused by New
York.' 14 1 UNEF I "was later described as a 'plate-glass window'-not
capable of withstanding assault, but nonetheless 'a lightly armed barrier
that all see and tend to respect."" 42
1. Help On Call, A Standing U.N. Army?
Peacekeeping has changed enormously from its inception in the Middle
East to operations undertaken today. One idea, however, continues to
endure; that of a permanent or standing U.N. force. It seems as though
every Secretary-General has a secret ambition to be a Commanding
General. Such an ambition seemed likely to be fulfilled with the founding
of the United Nations. Indeed, the Charter's preamble notes that "We the
peoples of the United Nations determined to save succeeding generations
from the scourge of war ...unite our strength to maintain international
137. United Nations, Peacekeeping: Middle East: UNTSO: Facts and Figures, availableat
http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/untso/facts.html (last visited Oct. 26, 2006).
138. Hammarskjild wrote report number A/3943, an extensive document dealing with the
appropriate methods of applying the doctrine of peacekeeping operations. See Secretary-General
Dag Hammarskjrld, Summary Study of the Experiences Derived from the Establishment and
Operationof the Force, U.N. Doc A/3934 (Oct. 9, 1958).
139. UNITED NATIONS, PEACEKEEPING: MIDDLE EAST: UNEF I, available at http://www.un.
org/Depts/dpko/dpko/timeline/pages/funul.html (last visited Oct. 26, 2006).
140. CHESTERMAN, supra note 15, at 104.
141. Id.(quoting TREVOR FINDLAY, THE USE OF FORCE IN U.N. PEACE OPERATIONS 50
(2002)).
142. Id.(quoting FINN SEYERSTED, UNITED NATIONS FORCES IN THE LAW OF PEACE AND WAR

48 (1966)).
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peace and security. '1 3 Moreover, Article 43 expressly required Member
States to provide troops to the United Nations. 1" The diplomatic wrangling
over Article 43 occurred in 1944 at Dumbarton Oaks, a research institute
145
administered by Harvard University, and located in Washington, D.C.
There the Allied powers decided that while the United Nations should not
have a permanent military force, Member States would negotiate "special
agreements" with the Security Council, providing an on-call force the
Council could call upon when they reached an Article 42 decision to use
military force. 146 Nonetheless, in the words of David Scheffer, the special
agreements were "stillborn."' 147 As Scheffer explains:
The Cold War and the realities of superpower politics intervened.
The grand bargain, which appeared promising in the draft model
special agreement, fell apart. The United States and the Soviet
Union in particular could not agree on the number and character of
forces that Member States would provide to the United Nations.
With the start of the Korean War and the resulting rift between
Washington and both Moscow and Beijing over the role of the
United Nations in that war, the concept of a standby U.N. force was
never again seriously
discussed by the Permanent Members of the
48
Security Council. 1

143. U.N. Charter pmbl.
144. Article 43(1) states:
All Members of the United Nations, in order to contribute to the maintenance of
international peace and security, undertake to make available to the Security
Council, on its call and in accordance with a special agreement or agreements,
armed forces, assistance, and facilities, including rights of passage, necessary for
the purpose of maintaining international peace and security.
U.N. Charter art. 43, para. 1.
145. ROBERT C. HILDERBRAND, DUMBARTON OAKS 67 (1990).
146. David J. Scheffer, Commentary on Collective Security, in LAW AND FORCE IN THE NEW
INTERNATIONAL ORDER 106-07 (Lori Damrosch Fisler ed., 1991) [hereinafter LAW AND FORCE].
See also Oscar Schachter, Authorized Use of Force by the United Nations and Regional
Organizations,in LAW AND FORCE, supra, at 68-69.
147. David J.Scheffer, Peacekeeping,Peacemaking,& Peacebuilding:The Role ofthe United
Nations in Global Conflict: PermanentPeacekeeping: The Theoretical& PracticalFeasibilityof
a UnitedNations Force: UnitedNationsPeaceOperationsandProspectsfor a Standby Force, 28
CORNELL INT'L L.J. 649-50 (1995).
148. Id. at650-51.
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With the end of the Cold War and the shift to multidimensional
peacekeeping, most U.N. peace operations have been hampered by the lack
of a sufficiently manned rapid deployment capability.'49 Most notoriously,
the lack of an adequately deployed force failed to prevent the deaths of
some 800,000 Tutsis in Rwanda in 1994.150 The Rwanda debacle

intensified interest in the development of a rapid deployment force. 5 ' In

149. In a 1994 article, the Economist recounts a tale to illustrate the difficulties of getting
boots on the ground, even when political will existed:
A year ago, Pakistan offered 3,000 unequipped troops for the U.N. force to
Bosnia. These days the countries that will supply men for peacekeeping often do
not have or will not spare the arms to go with them, and the countries that do have
the arms available often choose not to risk the lives of their men. The trick is to
marry the two. A Bosnian marriage seemed to be arranged when Germany offered
tanks for the Pakistanis.
But the tanks were Soviet-made from eastern Germany, and the Pakistanis, used
to western equipment, needed training on the ground. It was agreed, after much
toing and froing, to train them in Germany. Two months later the Germans found
that this was constitutionally forbidden. Instead, the Pakistanis would train in
Austria. Another two months later the Austrians discovered that they too could not
permit any such thing. A year late, the Pakistanis' six-week training has at last
begun in Slovakia.
U.N. Peacekeeping,supra note 4, at 19.
150. See infratext accompanying note 198. Decrying the lack of political will which generally
manifests itself in an inadequately staffed fighting force, the U.N. Assistance Mission for Rwanda
(UNAMIR) force commander, Lieutenant General Romdo Dallaire explained in a PBS interview:
In my pessimistic mood, I'd like to use the example of Diane Fossey and the
mountain gorillas in the northwest of Rwanda. I have this terrible feeling that if
some outfit wanted to go and slaughter those 300-odd gorillas, that today people
would react with far more consternation than they would if they started killing
thousands of black Africans, Rwandans, in the same country.
FRONTLINE, PuBLic BROADCASTING SYSTEM, GHOSTS OF RWANDA, INTERVIEW WITH ROMEO

DALLAIRE [hereinafter GHOSTS OF RWANDA], at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/
ghosts/interviews/dallaire.html (last visited Mar. 3, 2007).
151. Despite the arguments that can be delineated against a permanent force, and they are
considerable, there is no denying the actual benefits. P.F. Diehl identifies some of the principal
advantages. First, and most obviously, reaction time would be considerably less as Member States
would not have to be solicited for troop contributions. Second, professionalism would result from
a common training program enabling soldiers from different cultures to put into practice a common
set of TTPs (tactics, techniques, and procedures). Last, "financial stability results from
predetermined funding." Edward Moxon-Browne, A Futurefor Peacekeeping,in A FUTURE FOR
PEACEKEEPING 192, 194 (Edward Moxon-Browne ed., 1990) (citing P.F. DIEHL, INTERNATIONAL
PEACEKEEPING 134-42 (1994)).
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his cautious position paper entitled Supplement to the Agenda for Peace,
Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali proposed establishment of a
"rapid reaction force" numbering approximately 5,000 which would serve
as the Security Council's "strategic reserve."' 2 The idea was never taken
seriously. In addition to the budgetary and operational difficulties with
assembling such a force, the suggested numbers were unrealistic. A
fighting force of 5,000 does not go very far in terms of combat
effectiveness for two reasons. First is the so-called "tooth-to-tail" ratio.
Tooth-to-tail refers to the ratio of combat strength to logistical support.
That is, a single infantryman in the field generally requires 3-6 individuals
in the rear for support.'53 Second, military deployments are based on a

rotational ratio of 1:3.54 That is, as one troop is in the field, another is
training to replace him, while a third is recovering' 5 5 from service.
Consequently, based on a rotational ratio of 1:3 and a tooth-to-tail ratio of
1:5, a 5,000 man force yields approximately 500 infantrymen; hardly a
"strategic reserve."
When Boutros Boutros-Ghali's concept of a rapid reaction force failed
to materialize, the United Nations developed U.N. Standby Arrangements
System (UNSAS). According to the Brahimi Report, "UNSAS is a
database of military, civilian police and civilian assets and expertise
indicated by Governments to be available, in theory, for deployment to
United Nations peacekeeping operations...., 56 UNSAS has two major
weaknesses. First, the system allows members to say "no" to any operation
and is entirely voluntary.157 Consequently, as Anna Roberts notes, "[r] ather

152. Supplement to Agenda for Peace, supra note 7, 43.
153. See, e.g., David H. Hackworth, Needed: More Warriors, Not Military Toys (July 26,
1994), http://www.hackworth.com/26jul94.html. Writing over a decade ago, Hackworth explains:
The ratio of fighters to those who serve the beans, punch keyboards and fix planes
is called tooth to tail. The tail has grown since World War II at the expense of the
warriors who find, fix and fight the enemy. In Vietnam. [sic] There were never
more than, 50,000 grunts out of 560,000 people. During Desert Storm, the ratio
was about the same. In Somalia, there were 2,000 fighters to 23,000 supporters.
The 1994 U.S. armed forces are almost toothless.
Id.
154. Wedgwood, supra note 7, at 79.
155. The term "recovery" generally refers to the recovery of military equipment rather than
personnel.
156. Brahimi Report, supra note 2, at 102.
157. In a 1995 report published by the Government ofCanada and prepared by an international
consulting group chaired by Brian Urquhart ofthe Ford Foundation and Dr. John C. Polanyi, Nobel
Laureate of the University of Toronto, such a voluntary approach was criticized. The Report notes,
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than guaranteeing troop provision, the system has the potential only to play
a more limited role, namely preventing the Security Council from
authorizing an operation or troop level that is clearly impossible."'' 8 The
second problem with UNSAS and standby arrangement services in general
is that there are only so many troops to go around. If a nation for example
"contributes" a troop to UNSAS, that is one less soldier that can be
deployed under a peace operation undertaken by a regional organization.
As this article argues, African regional organizations may be better suited
to address African problems than the Security Council and arguably,
reserving troops to a standby arrangement seems to be a poor allocation of
a limited resource. In his 2005 Report entitled In Larger Freedom, the
Secretary-General acknowledged this problem. He wrote:
United Nations capacity should not be developed in competition
with the admirable efforts now being made by many regional
organizations but in cooperation with them. Decisions by the
European Union to create standby battle groups, for instance, and
by the African Union to create African reserve capacities, are a very
valuable complement to our own efforts. Indeed, I believe the time
is now ripe for a decisive move forward: the establishment of an
interlocking system of peacekeeping capacities that will enable the
United Nations to work with relevant regional organization in
predictable and reliable partnerships.' 59
Unfortunately, the Secretary-General never explains how these
interlocking systems are to be implemented or how they will operate.
2. Back to the Future: the Congo
Throughout the Cold War, peace operations undertaken by the United
Nations resembled the traditional peacekeeping of UNEF I with one major
exception. For four years in the early 1960s, the United Nations arguably
conducted its most controversial and difficult peacekeeping operation in
its history. U.N. Operation in the Congo (ONUC) divided the Security
Council, nearly bankrupt the United Nations at a staggering cost of $400
"As long as sovereign states retain the right to decide on the deployment of their national units,
there will never be complete assurance that a U.N. force can meet an urgent situation on time."
GOV'T OF CANADA, TOWARDS A RAPID REACTION CAPABILITY FOR THE U.N. 63 (1992).
158. Roberts, supranote 8, at 872-73.
159. Secretary-General Kofi Annan, Report of the Secretary-Generalof the United Nations
for Decisionby Heads of State and Government in September 2005: In LargerFreedom: Towards
Development, Security, and Human Rightsfor All, 112 U.N. Doc. A/59/2000 (Mar. 21, 2005).
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million, lead to the death of Nobel laureate and Secretary-General
Hammarskj6ld, 6' and ensured that force would not be used on a
comparable scale for thirty years.' 6 ' A 2005 RAND study on peacekeeping
succinctly notes the Herculean challenges facing ONUC: "The United
Nations was called upon to restore order, secure the removal of Belgian
forces, and help establish an indigenous government in a nascent country
with a mutinous army, a breakaway province, and little experience in selfgovernment."'' 6 2 This was clearly not your father's peacekeeping mission!
On July 12, 1960, President Patrice Lumumba requested military
assistance from the United Nations to restore order following the
breakaway of Katanga, an insurrection by Congolese soldiers, and the
entrance of Belgian paratroopers to protect Belgian nationals. 163 "Within
72 hours the United Nations rushed in 3,000" peacekeepers." 6 At the peak
65
of its operation, ONUC involved more than a division (19,828 troops).
Like any other peacekeeping operation undertaken at this time, ONUC
initially abided by the "Trinity" (consent, impartiality, and force only used
in self-defense). Nonetheless, the "Trinity" proved little value in a cruel
intra-state war with no civil structures. In little time, self-defense was
interpreted more broadly. Indeed, in several instances, U.N. troops were
ordered into battle to quell secessionist attempts. 66 As the RAND study
notes, ONUC conduct[ed] extended military campaigns, mount[ed]
offensive operations (employing among other assets artillery and fixedwing fighter-bombers), and decisively defeat[ed its] opponents.' ' 167 While
ONUC achieved the goal of the departure of Belgian military forces and
the territorial integrity of the state, it also contributed to the weakness of
the Congolese government, setting the conditions for the murderous
160. Hammarskj6ld's plane crashed near the border between Katanga and Northern Rhodesia
sometime in the evening of September 17-18, 1961. Fighting had broken out between rebels of
Katanga and U.N. forces and Hammarskj6ld was on his way to meet with President Tshombe of
Katanga to secure a cease-fire. To this day, many of the details of the crash are unknown. See
generally ARTHUR L. GAVSHON, THE LAST DAYS OF DAG HAMMARSKJOLD (1963).
161. CHESTERMAN, supra note 15, at 104.
162. JAMES DOBINS ET AL., RAND CORP., THE U.N.'s ROLE IN NATION-BUILDING FROM THE
CONGO TO IRAQ 7 (2005).

163. Id.at 10.
164. Karsten Prager, The Limits of Peacekeeping, TIME, Oct. 23, 1995, available at
http://www.time.com/time/intemationalI995/951023/cover2.html. As the Rand study notes: "[I]t
is worth recalling, therefore, that there was a time when the United Nations could field a substantial
and capable force within days of receiving Security Council authorization ..." DOBBINS ET AL.,
supra note 162, at 26.
165. AKsu, supra note 136, at 100; DOBBINS ET AL., supranote 162, at 11.
166. Prager, supranote 164.
167. DOBBINS ET AL., supranote 162, at 26.
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kleptocracy of Sese Seko Mobutu. 68 Moreover, one must question the
years later, the Congo would be
long-term impact of ONUC, when forty
169
war.
world
first
Africa's
in
embroiled
Though no one would have wanted to believe it at the time, Congo
provided a glimpse of the future: failed states, horrific intra-state violence,
and pressure to "do something."' 7 ° Unfortunately, as Chesterman notes,
"Congo was regarded as an aberration: the U.N. Secretariat and the
member states were 'more interested in forgetting than in learning, more
interested in avoiding future ONUC's than in doing them better."'"17 ' The
RAND study concludes that the United Nations learned several lessons
from its first departure from traditional peacekeeping:
1. The money and manpower demands of nation-building almost
always exceed the supply.
2. Peace enforcement is costly and controversial, even when done
well.
3. Democratic17 2 development can conflict with other priority
objectives.
Tragically, these are lessons
the United Nations had clearly forgotten by
173
the end of the Cold War.
B. MultidimensionalPeacekeepingin the Post-Cold War
In the immediate years following the end of the Cold War, there were
hopeful signs that the Security Council would at last be able to fulfill its
primary role in the maintenance of peace and security envisioned by the
Charter's framers. In 1988 there was tremendous hope. Two of the decades
deadliest conflicts, the Iran-Iraq war and the Soviet withdrawal from
Afghanistan, ended and the United Nations undertook traditional
peacekeeping missions in both. 74 That year the UNDPKO (headed by Kofi

168. Id.at 13.
169. At the height of the conflict, fighting in the Congo involved nine different African
nations. See, e.g., USUN Press Release #18, Statement by Ambassador Richard C. Holbrooke, U.S.
Permanent Rep. to the United Nations (Feb. 7, 2000), availableat http://www.un.int/usa/00_018.
htm (last visited Jan. 27, 2007).
170. Prager, supra note 164.
171. CHESTERMAN, supra note 15, at 105.
172. DOBBINS ET AL., supra note 162, at 26.
173. See, e.g., supra Parts III.B. 1-3.
174. U.N. Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan (UNGOMAP) lasted from May
1988 until March 1990, and was responsible for monitoring the 1988 Geneva Accords, which
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Annan) won the Nobel Peace Prize.' 75 At this time, the United Nations had
7 peacekeeping operations ongoing with some 10,000 persons.' 76 Within
6 years, the United Nations would have 17 operations; more than had been
deployed in the organization's first 45 years; with a peak of 87,000
soldiers, police, and civil professionals. 77 In 1989 the United Nations
embarked on a far more ambitious and complex, yet stunningly successful,
mission in the transition of a democratic Namibia from South African
rule. 178 The sentiment at this time, as expressed by William Durch, was
that U.N. peacekeeping was a "magic bullet" to regional conflict. 79
Nevertheless, all good things must come to an end. Rather than
resulting in what Francis Fukuyama has called the "end of history""'8 and
the triumph of liberal democracies, the end of the Cold War ushered in a
process of unprecedented intra-state disintegration and violence, ethnic
cleansing, and massive refugee flows. Within a few short years the
incredible optimism which had greeted the end of the Cold War was
replaced with justified skepticism, resulting from stunning peacekeeping
tragedies in Somalia, Rwanda, and the Balkans. Boutros Boutros-Ghali's
ambitious 1992 call to action, An Agenda for Peace1 81 was decisively

committed "Afghanistan and Pakistan to non-interference and voluntary return ofrefugees." United
Nations, Peacekeeping: Middle East: UNGOMAP Timeline, at http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/
dpko/timeline/pages/ungomap.html (last visited Jan. 27, 2007). U.N. Iran-Iraq Military Observer
Group (UNIMOG) lasted from August 1988 until February 1991, and was responsible for
monitoring the cease-fire. United Nations Peacekeeping: Operations Timeline: UNIMOG,
http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/timeline/pages/gomnu2.html (last visited Oct. 26, 2006).
175. See RIEFF, supranote 3, at 13-14.
176. Ramesh Thakur & Albrecht Schnabel, Cascading Generationsof Peacekeeping:Across
the Mogadishu Line to Kosovo and Timor, in U.N. PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS, supranote 73, at
11.
177. Id.
178. U.N. Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) lasted from April 1989 until March 1990.
Much more than a "plate glass window," UNTAG was responsible for election monitoring and civil
society building. See UNTAG Timeline, http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/timeline/pages/
ganupt.html (last visited Jan. 27, 2007).
179. Durch, Keeping the Peace: Politics and Lessons of the 1990s, in U.N. PEACEKEEPING,
supra note 38, at 12.
180. See generally FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, THE END OF HISTORY AND THE LAST MAN (1993)
(arguing that with the end of the Cold War, a consensus concerning the legitimacy of liberal
democracy as a system of government had emerged throughout the world and liberal democracy
constituted an endpoint in man's ideological evolution).
181. The genesis of An Agendafor Peace was a 1992 request made to the Secretary-General
by the Security Council to submit a report on the organization's peacekeeping activities:
[The Security Council] invite[s] the Secretary-General to prepare, for circulation
to the Members of the United Nations by 1 July 1992, his -analysis and
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scaled back by the Supplement to the Agendafor Peacein 1995. i2Kantian
exultations to a New World Order and claims of a "springtime for
intervention"' 183 were replaced by the Somalia syndrome"' 184 and a
triumvirate of tragedies to include Somalia, Rwanda, and Bosnia.

recommendations on ways of strengthening and making more efficient within the
framework and provisions of the Charter the capacity of the United Nations for
preventive diplomacy, for peacemaking and for peace-keeping.
Doc. S/23500, supra note 79, at 3. An Agenda for Peace included four types of operations:
preventive diplomacy, which sought to ease tensions before they result in conflict; peacemaking,
which sought to bring hostile parties to agreement "essentially through such peaceful means as
those foreseen in Chapter VI ofthe Charter"; peacekeeping; and post-conflict peace building, which
include efforts to consolidate peace. Post-conflict peace building includes but is not limited to DDR
(disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration), return of refugees, civil society building, and
election monitoring. An Agenda for Peace, supra note 29, at
55. The Secretary-General also
made another plea for standby troop arrangements which was largely ignored. Id. 51.
182. In his introduction to Supplement to an Agenda for Peace, Boutros Boutros-Ghali
explains: "The purpose of the present position paper, however, is not to revise "An Agenda for
Peace" nor to call into question structures and procedures that have been tested by time.... Its
purpose is, rather, to highlight selectively certain areas where unforeseen, or only partly foreseen
difficulties have arisen ..." Supplement to Agenda for Peace, supranote 7, 6. Despite efforts
to the contrary, there is no denying that the Supplement was, in the words of William Durch, "a
rhetorical retreat." Durch, Keeping the Peace: Politics and Lessons of the 1990s, in U.N.
PEACEKEEPING, supra note 38, at xxviii. Most notably, the Supplement drew a sharp distinction
between traditional peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations, whereas in Agenda, Boutros
Boutros-Ghali had somewhat incomprehensibly explained that peacemaking is action "essentially
through such peaceful means as those foreseen in Chapter VI." An Agenda for Peace, supra note
29, 20.
183. James F. Hoge, Jr., Editor'sNote, 72 FOREIGN AFF. v (1992-1993).
184. According to Thomas G. Weiss, "The apparent failure of agonizing American and U.N.
efforts in this hapless country have led to the 'Somalia Syndrome': multilateral interventions to
thwart starvation, genocide, the forced movement of peoples, and massive violations of
fundamental rights are no longer politically or operationally feasible." Weiss, supra note 66.
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1. Somalia185
The painful lesson that traditional peacekeeping was wholly inadequate
for contemporary intra-state conflicts was first learned in the streets of
Mogadishu. Tragically, Somalia would not be the last time the United
Nations tried to do peacekeeping on the cheap when what was required
was robust peace enforcement. The U.N. Operation in Somalia (UNISOM
I) deployed 500 peacekeepers. This was quite extraordinary given the
"lawlessness and violence in Mogadishu."' 186 Thomas Mockaitis questions
how the United Nations could have ever believed that 500 lightly armed
peacekeepers could have ensured UNISOM's mission of ensuring the
transport and protection of relief
supplies meant for starving Somalis given
187
nation.
that
in
anarchy
the
A second pivotal mistake came in the summer of 1992. Following the
killing of twenty-four Pakistanis, Admiral Jonathan Howe, a retired fourstar U.S. Navy Admiral and Special Representative to the U.N. Secretary
for Somalia identified General Mohamad Farid Aidid as the force behind
the ambush and called directly for his arrest. This act shattered two of the
elements of the "trinity" (consent and impartiality), thereby transforming
a peacekeeping operation into peace enforcement, but without the
adequatecapability.As paragraph 312 of the Joint Warfare Publication 350 warns, operations
with no consent and limited capability are
"untenable."' 88 The United Nations even distributed a "wanted" poster
offering a $25,000 reward for the capture of clan leader Mohamad Farid

185. The debacle in Somalia has been the subject of a great deal of research. One of the best
pieces on the subject is the masterful study of the anything but 'seamless' transition between the
United Task Force (UNITAF) and the U.N. Operation in Somalia II (UNISOM II) by Susan
Rosegrant and Michael D. Watkins. See generally SUSAN ROSEGRANT & MICHAEL D. WATKINS,
A SEAMLESS TRANSITON: UNITED STATES AND UNITED OPERATIONS IN SoMALIA-1992-1993

(1996); see also MARK BOWDEN, BLACK HAWK DOWN: A STORY OF MODERN WAR (1994); JOHN
L. HIRSCH & ROBERT L. OAKLEY, SOMALIA AND OPERATION RESTORE HOPE: REFLECTIONS ON

PEACEMAKING AND PEACEMAKING (1995); CENTER FOR NAVAL ANALYSES, KATHERINE MCGRADY,
THE JOINT TASK FORCE IN OPERATION RESTORE HOPE (1994); JONATHAN STEVENSON, LOSING

MOGADISHU: TESTING U.S. POLICY IN SOMALIA (1995); CENTER OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES,
LEARNING FROM SOMALIA: THE LESSONS OF ARMED HUMANIrARIAN INTERVENTION, (Walter

Clarke & Jeffrey Herbst eds. 1997); Chester A. Crocker, The Lessons of Somalia: Not Everything
Went Wrong, 74 FOREIGN AFF. 1 (1995).
186. BOuTROS BOUTROS-GHALI, INTRODUCTION TO THE UNITED NATIONS, THE UNITED

NATIONS AND SOMALIA, 1992-1996, at 1 (1996).
187. Roberts, supra note 8, at 863 (quoting THOMAS R. MOCKAITIS, PEACE OPERATIONS AND
INTRASTATE CONFLICT: THE SWORD OR THE OLIVE BRANCH? 53 (1999)).

188. See supra text accompanying note 75.
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Aidid (believed to be the mastermind behind an attack killing twenty-four
Pakistani peacekeepers).189 In a remarkable interview with Frontline,
Admiral Howe explained the decision behind the "wanted" poster:
Let me straighten you out on this particular wanted poster because
I know that there's been a lot of discussion about it. [That was a]
very tough decision that we weighed back and forth; at least, I
listened to a lot of advice and I certainly discussed this with New
York a number of times [about] whether to name [Aidid] as
somebody that we felt should be detained. And for a lot of reasons
on the 17th of June, I announced that Aidid was somebody that we
felt should be detained for public safety, the safety of the Somalis
and for the safety of the international people that were present in
Somalia. The reason I'd come to that conclusion is that we had
progressed far enough in the investigation that we were starting to
be convinced that he really was responsible. I didn't want to say
anything; there was huge pressure in the press, "When are you
going to name Aidid? Why aren't you arresting him?"
What happened is about two or three weeks later... our military
came and said, "You know, nobody on the street believes us, when
we say that we want to detain Aidid, because you're not providing
any cash, there are no rewards for providing information to where
he is, there's nothing in this for us, you're not serious." They were
saying we're not really credible unless we offer some kind of
reward, and of course for terrorists. . . these kinds of rewards for
information are provided, so then I began a process of talking to the
U.N., because I didn't have $25,000 that I had control of, that I
could pay out in case somebody did in fact give us the information
that led to his detention. So a process went on and we asked the
U.S. for money because the U.S. has billions of dollars that could
be allotted for terrorism. The U.S. refused but the U.N. eventually
gave us the green light that yes, we could do it, and then some
leaflets were distributed that said he was wanted. 90
Most remarkably, when asked directly whether publicly identifying
Aidid created a whole host of other problems, Admiral Howe appears to

189. See ROSEGRANT & WATKINS, supra note 185.
190.

FRONTLINE, PUBLIC BROADCASTING SYSTEM, AMBUSH IN MOGADISHU, INTERVIEW WITH

ADM. JONATHAN HOWE, available at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/ambush/

interviews/howe.html (last visited Oct. 26, 2006).
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have completely misunderstood the significance of what had taken place.
The segment from Frontline is again worth quoting at length:
Interviewer: One would understand why some action needed to
be taken, yet does this formal recognition by the U.N. that Aidid's
going to be captured then create another host of problems for you?
Howe: A lot of just practical problems needed to be dealt
with-Where do we put him? How do we do it? What is the legal
process that we'll follow? We [had to do] a lot of planning,
particularly when the Ranger force came in and the prospects were
greater than they were initially.' 9'
Perhaps the greatest tragedy of Somalia is that rather than providing the
impetus for a frank discussion of the applicability of traditional
peacekeeping in the post-Cold War, the legacy of Somalia has been the
unwillingness of Western nations to send troops into African conflicts,
even when, in Rwanda, it leads to the death of more than three-quarters of
a million people. This point was underscored in 2000 when Jordan
withdrew a total of 1,830 personnel from the UNAMSIL (U.N. Mission in
Sierra Leone). 92 The Jordanian force represented approximately fifteen
percent of the operation's personnel. Jordan noted the West's failure 1to
93
commit soldiers to UNAMSIL as one of the reasons for its withdrawal.
2. Rwanda
The Rwandan genocide of 1994 had its origins four years earlier. In
1990 Tutsi rebels living in Uganda (known as the Rwandan Patriotic Front
(RPF)) attacked the government of President Habyarimana (a Hutu). 94 An
uneasy peace was ushered in with the Arusha Peace Agreement, which
envisaged a role for the United Nations in its implementation and in
October 1993 the U.N. Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR) was
established with 2,500 troops.' 95 Six months after the establishment of

191. Id.
192. See GLOBAL SECURITY.ORG, ANNAN CONFIRMS WITHDRAWAL OF JORDANIAN TROOPS
FROM U.N. SIERRA LEONE MISSION, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2000/1 0/
war-00 I 025-afsle.htm (last visited Oct. 26, 2006).
193. See USIP Report, supra note 10, pt. II, available at http://www.USIP.org/pubs/
specialreports/sr66-part2.html.
194. See ALISON DES FORGES, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, LEAVE NONE TO TELL THE STORY:
GENOCIDE IN RWANDA 59-60 (1999).
195. UNITED NATIONS DEP'T OF PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS, UNAMIR, http://www.un.org/
Depts/dpko/dpko/timeline/pages/minuar.htm (last visited Oct. 26, 2006).
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UNAMIR, President Habyarimana's Falcon jet (a gift from President
Frangois Mitterand) was hit by two portable surface-to-air missiles fired
from outside the airport grounds. 96
The massacre of Tutsis and moderate Hutus began within hours. In the
next 100 days an estimated 800,000 people were slaughtered in the worst
incidence of genocide since the Holocaust. In a truly shameful act, two
weeks after the death of Habyarimana, the Security Council
incomprehensibly reduced the number of UNAMIR soldiers to less than
300.1' As the Organization of African Unity (OAU) Report, Rwanda, the
PreventableGenocide notes, "[t]oday, it seems barely possible to believe.
The international community actually chose to abandon the Tutsi of
Rwanda at the very moment when they were being exterminated."' 98
In a truly heartbreaking and damning report, the OAU conducted an
investigation into the events of the genocide. Published in 2000, this was
the "first time in the history of the OAU that Africa's Heads of State and
Governments have established a commission that will be completely
independent of its creators in its findings and its recommendations. 99
On the culpability of the international community, the OAU Report
writes:
If there is anything worse than the genocide itself, it is the
knowledge that it did not have to happen. The simple, harsh, truth
is that the genocide was not inevitable; and that it would have been
relatively easy to stop it from happening prior to April 6, 1994, and
then to mitigate the destruction significantly once it began. In the
words of one expert,200"This was the most easily preventable
genocide imaginable.
The genocide was largely carried out with low-tech weapons, including
clubs, machetes, small arms, and cans of gasoline.2 0 ' As the OAU Report
echoes:

196. RIEFF, supra note 3, at 64, 71.
197. S.C. Res. 912, U.N. SCOR, 3368th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/912 (Apr. 21, 1994).
198. Org. of African Unity, Int'l Panel of Eminent Personalities to Investigate the 1994
Genocide in Rwanda and the Surrounding Events, 10.12 (July 7,2000) [hereinafter OAU Report],
available at http://www.visiontv.ca/RememberRwanda/Report.pdf (last visited Oct. 30, 2006).
199. Id. 1.
200. Id. 10.1.
201. RIEFF,supranote 3, at 71.
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[T]he conspirators may have seemed formidable in local terms
but in fact they were small in number, modestly armed, and
substantially dependent on the outside world.... The plot leaders
were in it for the spoils. Even a hint, let alone a threat that further
aid or loans or arms would not be forthcoming [would be] taken
very seriously indeed.2"2
One of the most consistent arguments that the genocide could have
been prevented comes from Lieutenant General Romeo Dallaire, the
UNAMIR Commander. Dallaire has repeatedly suggested that with a
brigade (5,000 or more troops) and the right mandate, UNAMIR could
have prevented most of the killings." 3
In 1998, the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, the
Institute for the Study of Diplomacy at Georgetown University, and the
U.S. Army tested Dallaire's assumption. The three institutions brought
together a host of international and military leaders with experience in
peace operations and Colonel Scott Feil, of the U.S. Army, wrote the final
report.2°
COL Feil's conclusion confirmed Dallaire's assumption:
In retrospect, a capable force of 5,000 troops inserted during April
7-21 could have significantly squelched the violence, prevented its
spread from the capital to the countryside, and removed the RPF's
pretext for renewing its fight with the RGF [Rwandan Government
Forces]. This force, however, would have required significantly
different and enhanced capabilities than Dallaire's original peacekeeping contingent-one with more firepower and mobility. A
regular infantry brigade, with all of its organic weapons and
helicopters for in-country transportation, should have formed its
core. Tanks would not have been necessary-armored personnel
carriers (APCs) could have intimidated any opponent. Some

10.2-3.
202. OAU Report, supra note 198,
203. See GHOSTS OF RWANDA, supra note 150. See also U.N. OrganizationMission in the
DemocraticRepublic of Congo: A Casefor PeacekeepingReform: Briefing and HearingBefore
the Subcomm. on Africa, Global Human Rights, and Int'l Operations of the Comm. on Int 'l
Relations, 109th Cong. 22 (2005) [hereinafter Lute Testimony] (statement of Jane Holl Lute, U.N.
Assistant Secretary-General for Mission Support in the Dep't of Peacekeeping Operations); OAU
Report, supra note 198. See generally ROMtO DALLAIRE, SHAKE HANDS WITH THE DEVIL: THE
FAILURE OF HUMANITY IN RWANDA (2004).

204. See Scott R. Feil, Could 5,000 PeacekeepersHave Saved 500,000 Rwandans?: Early
Intervention Reconsidered, ISD REPORT (1997) [hereinafter Carnegie Report], available at
http://sfswww.georgetown.edu/sfs/programs/isd/files/rwanda.htm (last visited Oct. 26, 2006).
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panelists argued that artillery would also have been needed, but
most modem infantry units carry mortars, which would have been
adequate. In addition, compatible, secure communications and a
robust logistics and support system would have been essential. In
contrast, UNAMIR's communications were provided by
contractors; it never had more than three to five days of supplies on
hand; and its twelve APCs lacked spare parts, mechanics,2 5 tools,
or operator training. When the fighting started, only six were
operational." 6
In addition to a more robust UNAMIR, other theories have suggested
that the genocide could have been prevented. Throughout the genocide, for
example, the RGF employed the state radio station, Radio Rwanda, to
broadcast hate of the Tutsi as well as directions as how to carry it out
(often providing commentary on locations of large groups of Tutsis).2 °7
The United States considered jamming the broadcasts from military
aircraft, but found the price ($8,000 an hour) prohibitive.2 8
In hindsight, it is inconceivable why UNAMIR was forced to operate
under a Chapter VI mandate. In explaining the limitations this imposed on
him, Dallaire explains:
[As a] Chapter VI peace keeping [mission, our mandate included]
just self defense and responding to what either side are telling us in
our patrolling. I had no intelligence capability, officially ....
I
could not conduct any covert operations. I could not conduct hard
intelligence gathering on either side, in the classic sense. I was
totally dependent on the good will of both sides, and my ability to
monitor. That was it. The ability to monitor is not necessarily
always the most effective intelligence gathering; you do need other
operations. You need even signals intelligence, the phones, the
radios, all that kind of stuff.20 9
In a particularly scathing indictment on the U.N. Secretariat, the OAU
notes a communication between Dallaire and Kofi Annan on April 9 (day

205. GHOSTS OF RWANDA, supra note 150.

206. Id.
207. DES FORGES, supra note 194, at 248-49.
208. Combating War Crimes in Africa Statement to Comm. on Int'l Relations, Subcomm. on

Africa, 109th Cong. 1 (2004) (statement of Corinne Dufka, Senior Researcher and West Africa
Team Leader, Human Rights Watch).
209. GHOSTS OF RWANDA, supra note 150.
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three of the genocide) regarding permissible exceptions to the "Trinity."
Annan's cable to Dallaire read:
You should make every effort not to compromise your impartiality
or to act beyond your mandate.... But [you] may exercise your
discretion to do [so] should this be essential for the evacuation of
foreign nationals. This should not, repeat not, extend to
participating in possible combat except in self-defense."'
As the OAU Report expresses, "This double standard seems to us
outrageous. No such instructions were ever given to Dallaire about
protecting innocent Rwandan civilians.... Is there a conclusion 21 1 we can
expatriate lives were considered
draw from this incident other than' 1that
2
more valuable than African lives?"
The U.N. performance in Rwanda borders on the criminally
incompetent. That is not to say, however, that Member States don't have
blood on their hands. Indeed, according to Dallaire, it is not the Secretariat
or even the Security Council that are most culpable, but rather certain
members of the Council.2 13 Rwanda was, in the words of Dallaire's
memoirs, "the failure of humanity." ' France had had a particularly close
relationship with the genocidal Hutu regime and astonishingly continued
to ship arms to the government after the genocide had begun.21 5 The
United States was at the forefront of supporting a decrease in UNAMIR's
strength and when the Security Council finally announced a deployment
of a 5,500 man strong UNAMIR II, the United States proved highly
an additional seven weeks to
reluctant to contribute a contingent and took
2 16
negotiate a contract for delivering APCs.
The most damning critiques however, per the OAU Report, belong with
the U.N. Secretariat. An infamous incident, which has come to be known
as the "genocide fax" clearly illustrates the sheer incompetency of the
Secretariat. Three months prior to the genocide, Dallaire received
information of the impending horrors from a high-ranking Hutu informant.

210. OAU Report, supra note 198, 1 10.15. See also LetterDated15 December 1999from the
Secretary-GeneralAddressed to the Presidentof the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/1 999/1257
(Dec. 16, 1999) [hereinafter Independent Inquiry into Genocide].
211. GHOSTS OF RWANDA, supranote 150.
212. OAU Report, supranote 198, 10.15.
213. See generally DALLAIRE, supra note 203.
214. Id.
215. CNN.corn, Rwanda Plumbs Unanswered Questions of 1994 Genocide, Apr. 7, 1998,
available at, http:www.cnn.com/WORLD/afiica/9804/07rwanda (last visited Oct. 30, 2006).
216. OAU Report, supra note 198, 10.16.
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Dallaire sent a fax detailing the intelligence to U.N. Military Advisor
General Maurice Baril at DPKO in New York. Annan (as head of DPKO)
chose to bury the fax. Neither the Secretary-General nor the Security
Council were given the opportunity to assess its credibility for themselves.
Instead, Dallaire received orders from Annan the morning after having
' In an understatement of the century,
sent the fax to "cease and desist."217
the U.N. Independent Inquiry into the genocide acknowledged that
"serious mistakes were made in dealing with the cable[s]."'2 18
3. Bosnia
The architect of the Dayton Peace Accords, Richard Holbrooke, has
suggested that "[t]he damage that Bosnia did to the U.N. was
incalculable .... "2 19 The Bosnian government declared independence on
March 3, 1992. A little more than a month later the European Community
recognized the Independence of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
The United States followed suit the next day.220 Within a month of the
declaration of independence, war broke out between Bosnian Serbs,
hoping to create a "greater Serbia" and Bosnian Muslims. In time, the
Croatian Army was also involved in the fighting.
As the fighting increased, so too did the flurry of paper generated by
the Security Council. Within the first eighteen months of the war, the
Security Council generated a staggering forty-seven resolutions.22 ' One of
these, Security Council Resolution 53/35, demanded that all parties treat
Srebrenica, a mountain valley municipality with 37,000 inhabitants
(27,000 of whom were Bosnian Muslims or Bosniaks) and its surroundings
as a "safe area., 22 2 Given the number of available troops, the "safe haven"
concept was sheer fantasy. Major General (MG) Lewis MacKenzie, the
Canadian Commander in the U.N. Sarajevo sector thought the job could
get done with 100,000 troops.223 MacKenzie's successor, Philippe

217. GHOSTS OF RWANDA, supra note 150.
218. Independent Inquiry into Genocide, supra note 210, at 33.
219. Alison Mitchell, Clinton'sAbout Face,N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24, 1996, at A8. An article in
the July 1995 Economist cites the contribution of the war in Bosnia to Orwellian doublespeak:
"Safe, we now know, means deadly dangerous; a rapid reaction will occur next month, maybe; an
air strike is what happens when a ground-launched missile hits a NATO warplane; and a protection
force offers none of either." The Injuries of War, ECONOMIST, July 29, 1995, at 64.
220. U.N. Report on Srebrenica, supra note 5, 16.
221. Id. 41.
222. Id. See also S.C. Res. 819, 33, 3799th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/819 (Apr. 16, 1993).
223. Prager, supra note 164.
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Morillon believed the concept could work with 75,000.224 SecretaryGeneral Boutros Boutros-Ghali requested 34,000.225 Eventually, 5,000
were deployed, some taking a year to arrive.226 Some believe that Boutros
Boutros-Ghali should have at that point refused to implement
this fantasy
22 7
and resigned, rather than "be party to a deception.,
228
On July 6, 1995, the Bosnian Serbs launched an attack on Srebrenica.
Responsibility for protecting upwards of 25,000 Bosniaks fell to Dutchbat,
a Dutch battalion. Dutchbat was a battalion in name only; in actuality it
consisted of approximately 200 lightly armed soldiers.22 9 Dutchbat had
conducted no intelligence-gathering and its APCs had been stripped of the
twenty mm. canons which are standard NATO equipment. "[A]fter all,"
as Ruth Wedgwood scornfully notes, "this was peacekeeping. 2 30 At least
three requests for close air support made by Dutchbat were turned down
by New York.23' Moreover, Dutchbat did not fire a single shot at the
advancing Serbs.232 As Ruth Wedgwood explains, the fall of Srebrenica,
"was a debacle of peacekeeping in its classical mode with minimal use of
force, the pretense of consent, neutrality between the parties, and above
all, the attempt to avoid antagonizing the local combatants in a way that
23 3
might endanger U.N. 23
personnel.
The failure of the safe zones was
4
"entirely predictable.,

Nevertheless, no one could have imagined the

extent of the massacre. Over 7,000 Muslim men and boys were killed by
the Serbs.235
In its 1999 Report on Srebrenica, the United Nations issued its own
unflinching mea culpa. In its assessment of the tragedy it writes:
The fall of Srebrenica is also shocking because the enclaves
inhabitants believed that the authority of the United Nations

224. Id.
225. Security Council Resolution 844 authorized 7,600. S.C. Res. 844, U.N. SCOR, 3241st
mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/844 (June 18, 1993).
226. Prager, supra note 164.
227. Wedgwood, supranote 7, at 76.
228. O'CONNELL, supranote 17, at 340.

229. See John Keegan, PlayingPoliceman is Thankless: Doing It Badly Can End in Tragedy,
DAILY TELEGRAPH (London), Apr. 17, 2002, at 20.

230. Wedgwood, supranote 7, at 76.
231. O'CONNELL, supranote 17, at 340

232. Id. at 341.
233. Wedgwood, supranote 7, at 76.
234. JANE BOULDEN, PEACE ENFORCEMENT:
SOMALIA, AND BOSNIA 113 (2001).
235. Wedgwood, supranote 7, at 74.
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Security Council, the presence of UNPROFOR peacekeepers, and
the might of NATO air power, would ensure their safety. Instead,
the Bosnian Serb forces ignored the Security Council, pushed aside
the UNPROFOR troops, and assessed correctly that air power
would not be used to stop them. They overran the safe area of
Srebrenica with ease, and then proceeded to depopulate the territory
within 48 hours. Their leaders then engaged in high-level
negotiations with representatives of the international community
while their forces on the ground executed and buried thousands of
men and boys within a matter of days.2 36

The report goes on to say, "Questions must be answered, and foremost
among them are the following: how can this have been allowed to happen?
And how will the United Nations ensure that no future peacekeeping
'
operation witnesses such a calamity on its watch?"237
The world is still waiting for an answer.
C. The Most Important Document on PeacekeepingEver Written?
Following the triumvirate of tragedies of the 1990s the United Nations
entered a period of inactivity. As the Stimson center study on the Brahimi
Report concluded:
This relatively fallow period could have been viewed as breathing
space to correct the more obvious problems with U.N.
peacekeeping, but there seemed to be little interest on the part of
states to invest more time and money in what was assumed in many
quarters to be a failed enterprise.238
At the end of the decade however, with a burst of activity in Kosovo,
East Timor, and Sierra Leone, the United Nations was once again called
upon.2 3 9 Responding to these challenges, on March 7, 2000, SecretaryGeneral Annan convened a high-level panel to conduct a thorough review
of U.N. peacekeeping activities. The panel was chaired by former Foreign
Minister of Foreign Affairs of Algeria, Lakhdar Brahimi, and consisted of

236. U.N. Report on Srebrenica, supra note 5, T 468.
237. Id. 469.
238. WILLIAM DURCH, U.N. PEACE OPERATIONS AND THE "BRAHIMI REPORT" 2 (2001),
available at http://www.stimson.org/fopo/pdf/peaceopsbr1O01.pdf (last visited Dec. 8, 2006).
239. Id.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol19/iss1/3

48

Hollywood: It Takes a Village…or at Least a Region: Rethinking Peace Operati

IT TAKES A VILLAGE...

OR ATLEASTA REGION: RETHINKING PEACE OPERATIONS

a who's who in the fields of peace and humanitarian operations.24 ° In
August 2000, following fieldwork in Kosovo, 200 interviews, and
discussions with every department in the United Nations, the panel
published its findings in a report entitled Report of the Panel on United
Nations Peace Operations (more commonly known as the Brahimi
Report). 241 The U.S. Institute of Peace (USIP) calls it "the most important
document on peacekeeping ever written ' 1 2 and explains that "[t]he
Brahimi Report thus represents the first comprehensive attempt to assess
the evolution and effectiveness of U.N. peacekeeping missions over the
years and to specify important ways to improve... DPKO. '243
Whether the report is "the most important document on peacekeeping
ever written" is debatable. Nonetheless, the report has been widely praised
by supporters and critics of the United Nations alike for the frank, candid,
critical analysis it offers of the Secretariat and the organization
and often
24
itself.
The report makes its conclusions at the very beginning: "[T]he key
conditions for the success of future complex operations are political
support, rapid deployment with a robust force posture and a sound peacebuilding strategy., 245 As USIP notes, "[e]very recommendation that
follows is designed to ensure that these three conditions are met in the
future., 24 6 The Brahimi Report is a call to arms. At one point, the report
remarks matter-of-factly that "no amount of good intentions can substitute
for the fundamental ability to project credible force.,

24 7

The report also

makes the argument that unless U.N. forces can adequately defend
themselves, deploying in the first place is pointless. 248 As the Stimson
Center study concludes, "while the report rightly leaves war-fighting to
states, it urges U.N. member states to collaborate to make better-trained,
more capable forces available to U.N. operations., 249 Finally, the report

240. Id. In addition to Chairman Brahimi, the ten-member panel consisted of Mr. Brian
Atwood (United States); Mr. Colin Granderson (Trinidad and Tobago); Dame Ann Hercus (New
Zealand); Mr. Richard Monk (UK); General (ret.) Klaus Naumann (Germany); Ms. Hisako Shimura
(Japan); Ambassador Vladimir Shustov (Russian Federation); General Philip Sibanda (Zimbabwe);
and Dr. Cornelio Sommaruga (Switzerland). See Brahimi Report, supranote 2, at i.
241. See USIP Report, supra note 10, at 2.
242. Id. at I.
243. Id. at 2.
244. See, e.g., id. at 10.
245. Brahimi Report, supra note 2, 4.
246. USIP Report, supra note 10, at 2.
247. Brahimi Report, supra note 2, 1 3.
248. DURCH, supra note 238, at 5.

249. Id.
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calls for "clear, credible and achievable mandates"25 and proposes that the
"Secretariat must tell the Security Council what it needs to know, not what
it wants to hear, when formulating or changing mission mandates ....251
Had the United Nations been able to implement the report's
conclusions, it could have likely avoided the debacle in Somalia, but not
Rwanda. In Somalia, the problem was a mandate which deployed a lightly
armed peacekeeping force when what was required was a capable peace
enforcement force. In Rwanda, the problem was political will of Western
governments, for which the Brahimi Report, despite its considerable
contributions, offers no solutions.252
IV. THE EVOLUTION OF AMERICAN PEACE OPERATIONS
Carrying out civil administration and police functions is simply
going to degrade the American capability to do the things America
has to do. We don't need to have the 82nd Airborne escorting kids
to kindergarten. 53
Condoleezza Rice
U.S. support for U.N. peace operations has always been, and remains
critical. As the sole remaining superpower, a permanent member of the
Security Council, and the unrivaled military force in NATO, "the United
States [is] virtually essential for any meaningful military activity with
' It is therefore worth examining the often
humanitarian dimensions."254
uneasy relationship between the United States and the United Nations and
the evolution of American peacekeeping doctrine.
A. Uneasy Partnersin Peace
Since the founding of the United Nations in 1945, the United States has
annually been its largest financial contributor and in 2004 contributed over
$3 billion to the U.N. system. 255 Ifone were to compare a list of the top
250. Brahimi Report, supra note 2, 56.
251. Id. 64(d).
252. USIP addresses the "failure to address the central problem of all peacekeeping missions,
that is, the lack of political will by key Western governments to support U.N. peacekeeping
operations" as the report's major shortcoming. USIP Report, supra note 10, at 3.
253. William Drozdiak, Bush PlanWorries Europeans;Removing U.S. Troops FromBalkans
is Seen as Divisive, WASH. POST, Oct. 24, 2000, at A7.
254. See WEISS, supra note 39, at 156.
255. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, BUREAU OF POLITICALAFFAIRS, FACT SHEET: U.S. PARTICIPATION
IN THE UNITED NATIONS: FINANCIAL CONTRIBUTIONS (Sept. 9, 2004), available at
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fifteen financial contributors to U.N. peacekeeping and the top fifteen
troop-contributors to U.N. peacekeeping, not a single state on the two lists
would overlap.256 The United States is no exception. In July 2006, the
United States ranked thirty-first in troop contributing nations to U.N. peace
operations, with a total of 340 uniformed personnel257 (311 police, 16
military observers, and 13 troops). 258 This number reflects not only
priorities placed on fighting the War on Terror and an ambitious nationbuilding mission in Iraq, but a philosophical approach
by the Bush
25 9
administration which makes it wary of multilateralism.
The American military has long been wary of U.N. peace operations.
While the military favors clear-cut objectives, peace operations tend by
their very nature to be more ambiguous. 26' The American military has four
primary concerns with peace operations. First, there is always the danger
of sliding into "mission creep."26 ' Second, there is the concern that
peacekeeping operations degrade a unit's fighting capability. 262 The
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/53103.pdf (last visited Oct. 30, 2006).
256. See, e.g., Lute Testimony, supranote 203, at 22. Verheul, participant at the International
Law Odyssey 2001: Beyond the Limits, American Branch of the International Law Assoc. (Oct.
27, 2001).
257. For each troop serving in a U.N. peace operation, the U.S. government receives $1,028
per month from the United Nations. Lute Testimony, supra note 203, at 22.
258. UNITED NATIONS, DEP'T OF PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS, MONTHLY SUMMARY OF

CONTRIBUTORS OF MILITARY AND CIVILIAN POLICE PERSONNEL, July 2006, at http://www.un.org/
Depts/dpko/dpko/contributors/index.htm. The United States participates more fully in U.N.sanctioned peace operations of "coalitions of the willing." For example, it deployed over 4,800
troops to the NATO Kosovo Force (KFOR). David Sorenson, The UnitedStates, in THE POLITICS
OF PEACEKEEPING INTHE POST-COLD WAR ERA 114 (David S. Sorenson & Pia Christina Wood
eds., 2005).
259. For a fascinating study of how the events of September 11, 2001 continue to impact
American foreign policy, and the benefits to a multilateralist approach to international relations,
see Shepard Forman & Stewart Patrick, MULTILATERALISM AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY:
AMBIVALENT ENGAGEMENT (2001).
260. Sorenson, supra note 258, at 125.
261. The term "mission creep" first appeared in an April 15, 1993 Washington Postarticle by
columnist Jim Hoagland. Essentially, mission creep is the expansion of an operation's objectives
once its initial successes have been attained. The military's justifiable success is likely to lead to
more ambitious goals, halting only with some calamity. UNITAF is a perfect example of mission
creep. American involvement in Somalia began with the clear-cut objective of securing relief
supplies to starving Somalis. Once that goal had been attained, operations expanded to disarming
rebels and searching for Aidid. This in turn led to the death of eighteen American soldiers. See Jim
Hoagland, Preparedfor Non-Combat, WASH. POST, Apr. 15, 1993, at A29. See also John H.
Cushman Jr., Mission in Somalia is to Secure the City, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 10, 1993, at Al.
262. See, e.g., Wedgwood, supra note 7, at 83 ("If we take combat recruits and train them to
operate Bradley fighting vehicles and Abrams tanks in an integrated land-air campaign, and then
take them off their equipment and turn them into peacekeepers ... we will waste a lot of time and
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purpose of the U.S. Army is to "fight and win the nation's wars, 263
(considered to be major inter-state conflicts). 2' The argument here is that
time spent policing Bosnia is time a Bradley Fighting Vehicle Infantryman
is not honing his skills at gunnery and is therefore unprepared to carry out
his primary mission. 265 Third, peacekeeping places stresses on the
readiness of the overall force.26 6 In 1999, for example, Army Chief of
Staff, GEN Eric Shinseki expressed great concern over the combat
readiness of the 10th MID (which had approximately 45% of its units in
Bosnia) and the 1st Infantry Division (lID) (which had approximately
40% of its units in Kosovo). 2 67 Fourth, peace operations often raise
difficult issues of command and control of American servicemen. 68
It should be noted, however, that not all segments of the U.S. military
view participation in peace operations as degrading military effectiveness.

manpower."). Id. at 91.
263. See, e.g., UNITED STATES ARMY, ARMY VISION 2010: THE GEOSTRATEGC ENVIRONMENT
AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR LAND FORCES, available at http://www.army.miU2010/geostrategic_
environment.htm (last visited Oct. 30, 2006).
264. Daalder, supra note 80, at 469.
265. In 1994, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General John Shalikashvili expressed
concern that "my fear is that we're becoming mesmerized by operations other than war and we'll
take our mind off what we're all about, to fight and win our nation's wars." Id. at 472 (quoting
Shalikashvili:Focus Remains on Warfighting,Not Peacekeeping,DEF. DAILY, Sept. 2, 1994, at
354).
266. Sorenson, supranote 258, at 126.
267. Shinseki: DivisionReadiness ProblemsDue to Deployments, DEE. DAILY, Nov. 12, 1999,
at 29.
268. United States: Administration Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations
explains current U.S. policy with regard to operational command and control:
Presidential Decision Directive 25 underscores the fact that the President will
never relinquish command of U.S. forces. However as Commander-in-Chief, the
President has the authority to place U.S. forces under the operational control of a
foreign commander when doing so serves American security interests, just as
American leaders have done numerous times since the Revolutionary War,
including in Operation Desert Storm.-The greater the anticipated U.S. military
role, the less likely it will be that the U.S. will agree to have a U.N. commander
exercise overall operational control over U.S. forces. Any large scale participation
of U.S. forces in a major peace enforcement operation that is likely to involve
combat should ordinarily be conducted under U.S. command and operational
control or through competent regional organizations such as NATO or ad hoc
coalitions.
DEP'T OF STATE, BUREAU OF INT'L ORG. AFFAIRS, THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION'S POLICY ON

REFORMING MULTILATERAL PEACE OPERATIONS 33 I.L.M. 795 (1994) [hereinafter PDD 25]. PDD
25 remains a classified document. A "white paper" has, however, been released.
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In a perceptive paper written by COL (ret.) George Raach and included in
a volume edited by Raach and Antonia Chandler Hayes, former
undersecretary of the Air Force, the author argues that the effects of peace
operations can positively impact several readiness factors. 269 Drawing from
a briefing prepared by the 10th Mountain Infantry Division (MID), a light
infantry division stationed at Fort Drum, New York, which took part in
peace operations in Somalia27and
Haiti, Raach constructs the table below
0
(with minor modifications):
Super
Better than
JRTC/BCTP

I. Measures of
Unit
Effectiveness:
Morale,
Discipline, Spirit,
& Cohesion

Great
JRTC/BCTP
Level

Maneuver
Brigade &
Battalion

Good
Home
Station

Fair
Home
Station

Equivalent

Equivalent

Fire Support

Air
Defense

Readiness
Concern

Aviation
UH-60
Maintenance

II. Ability of
Commanders &
Staffs to Perform

Effectively:
C2; Staff
Training;
Intelligence;
Logistics
III. Ability of
Units to Conduct
Operations
Effectively:

Infantry Company
Aviation Units
Military Police

269. See George Raach, Military Perspectiveson Peace Operations,in PEACE OPERATIONS:
DEVELOPING AN AMERICAN STRATEGY (Antonia Handler Chayes & George Raach eds., 1995).
270. See id. at 83-98.
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The horizontal categories assess 10th Mountain's readiness and are
used to compare readiness gained (or lost) by serving in Somalia and Haiti
with serving in garrison and conducting regular training (to include
exercises at JRTC and BTCP). The two events referred to are the Joint
Readiness Training Center (JRTC), located at Fort Polk, Louisiana27 ' and
the Battle Command Training Program (BCTP),2 72 located at Fort
Leavenworth, Kansas. Both are prime training events for a unit and are
used as milestones of mission readiness. The vertical categories are areas
which commanders may use to determine the overall readiness level of
their unit.
Three general categories with various components improved during
participation in the peace operations. Morale, discipline, spirit, and
cohesion are arguably the most important factors in a unit's overall
readiness. Raach argues that these factors tend to rise on deployments as
commanders in garrison rarely have an opportunity to command their
forces in an operational setting, which is, after all, what they train to do.
Raach notes as well that many officers underscored the value that peace
operations have in training junior officers and NCOs in taking initiative
and making decisions. This is certainly true in this author's opinion, who
deployed to the Balkans twice; once as a Second Lieutenant and once as
a First Lieutenant, and believes his leadership skills were greatly
augmented as a result. Raach concludes that peace operations "certainly
did not undermine [10th MID's] readiness for conventional warfare and
did much to provide a firm foundation.... ""'
Notwithstanding military concerns with peacekeeping, the United
States and the United Nations have had a tense partnership in the
maintenance of international peace and security. Throughout the 1990s,
Senator Jesse Helms threatened to cut the organization's funding and the
United States withheld dues.274 In 2002, President Bush warned the
Security Council that the United States would refuse any future
participation in U.N. peacekeeping unless American soldiers were granted
immunity from prosecution of the International Criminal Court (ICC) by
the Security Council.275 Soon after the President withdrew his threat, and
instead embarked on a campaign to persuade 180 individual countries

271.
272.
273.
274.
Sept. 13,
A25.
275.

See generally JRTC & Fort Polk Web Site, at http://www.jrtc-polk.army.mil.
See generally www-bctc.army.mil.
Raach, supranote 269, at 91.
See, e.g., Steven Greenhouse, Senate PanelSlashes Funds of State Dept., N.Y. TIMES,
1995, at A9; William Safire, Essay: Holbrooke on Hold, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 1999, at
Sorenson, supra note 258, at 134.
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never to deliver an American to the ICC.2 76 Also in 2002, the U.S.
Congress passed the American Servicemembers' Protection Act (ASPA),
allowing the
U.S. government to prevent the extradition of U.S. citizens
2 77
to the ICC.
B. The Evolution ofAmerican PeacekeepingDoctrine
During the Cold War, the traditional peacekeeping's necessity of
impartiality generally precluded the United States from committing troops
to peacekeeping missions. As such, when the Cold War ended, the
United
2 78
States did not have a comprehensive doctrine on peacekeeping.
1. NSD 74
Shortly before President Bush left office in January 1993, he approved
a terse279 document which represented the first policy document devoted
to U.S. support of U.N. peacekeeping ever written.28 ° Coming before the
tragedies of the 1990s, one is struck by the document's tentativeness. It is
a cautious document by a cautious administration in a time calling for
caution. NSD 74 tentatively endorses U.S. participation in U.N.
peacekeeping provided that the unique U.S. military capabilities are
required for success of the mission.28 Ivo Daalder notes that some in the
Administration would have preferred that NSD 74 go further, but
opposition by the Pentagon could not be overcome.282 The task of
developing a comprehensive peacekeeping policy therefore devolved to
President Bush's successor.
2. PRD 13 & PDD 25
On May 3, 1994, President Clinton signed Presidential Decision
Directive (PDD) 25, Administration Policy on Reforming Multilateral
276.
A12.
277.
(2006)).
278.
279.

Peter Slevin, U.S. PressesAllies on War Crimes Court, WASH. POST, Aug. 27, 2002, at
See Pub. L. No. 107-206, 116 Stat. 899 (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. § 7402
Sorenson, supra note 258, at 117.
The entire document is less than three full pages. Because only part of the document has

been declassified, little more than a page is available to the public. See NAT'L SEC. COUNCIL,
NATIONAL SECURITY DIRECTIVE 74, PEACEKEEPING AND EMERGENCY HUMANITARIAN RELIEF, Nov.

24, 1992.
280. Daalder, supranote 80, at 38.
281. Id.
282. Id.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2007

55

Florida Journal of International Law, Vol. 19, Iss. 1 [2007], Art. 3

FLORIDA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 19

Peace Operations. PDD 25 is even more tentative than NSD 74 and

establishes rigorous standards for both supporting and participating in
peace operations. 8 3 One critic has referred to PDD 25 as "the latest U.S.
about-face"28 4 and goes on to say, "[t]he so-called policy reflects the extent
to which Washington has washed its hands of responsibility and
abandoned the mantle of leadership., 28 5 PDD 25 is indeed a
disappointment2 86 to those who had hoped that the Clinton administration
would embrace "assertive multilateralism. '28 7 Nonetheless, PDD 25 is a

283. PDD 25 lists the following factors in determining whether U.S. personnel will participate
in a given peacekeeping operation:
- Participation advances U.S. interests;
- Personnel, funds, and other resources are available;
- U.S. participation is necessary for operation's success;
- The role of U.S. forces is tied to clear objectives and an endpoint for U.S.
participation can be identified;
- Domestic and Congressional support exists or can be marshaled;
- Command and control arrangements are acceptable.
PDD 25, supra note 268, at 803-04. When there is the possibility of significant U.S. participation
in Chapter VII operations, there are even more rigorous factors to be considered:
- There exists a determination to commit sufficient forces to achieve clearly
defined objectives;
- There exists a plan to achieve those objectives decisively;
- There exists a commitment to reassess and adjust, as necessary, the size,
composition, and disposition of our forces to achieve our objectives.
PDD 25, supra note 268, at 804.
284. Weiss, supranote 66.
285. Id.
286. In a telling point, Weiss recounts an off-the-record remark by a State Department official
during the Rwandan genocide. Referring to PDD 25, the official decried, "It was almost as if the
Hutus had read it." Id.
287. The term was coined by Former U.N. Ambassador, Madeleine Albright. In testimony,
before the House, Albright explained:
Though sometimes we will act alone, our foreign policy will necessarily point
toward multilateral engagement. But unless the United States also exercises
leadership within collective bodies like the United Nations, there is a risk that
multilateralism will not serve our national interest well-in fact, it may undermine
our interests. These two realities-multilateral engagement and U.S. leadership
within collective bodies-requires an "assertive multilateralism" that advances
U.S. foreign policy goals.
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creature of its times. Coming seven months after the Battle of Mogadishu,
a broader directive would have been politically unsustainable.
PDD 25 looks nothing like Presidential Review Directive (PRD) 13,
the review directive on which the decision directive was based. Signed.88
in February 1993, PRD 13 provided for an active American role in U.N.
peace operations.289 In formulating PRD 13, the Clinton administration
even endorsed the establishment of a standing U.N. Army.
When this found no support in the Pentagon,29 ° the PRD went on to
recommend an "on-call" brigade-sized rapid reaction force.2 9' Under this
concept, different nations would be responsible for providing the on-call
units for six months at a time on a rotating basis. 292 The unit would be
modeled on a brigade of the 82nd Airborne Division and deployable
within seventy-two hours.2 93
When the Pentagon threatened that it would not support any part of
PRD 13 if the concept was retained, it too was dropped. The rapid reaction
force had been the final outstanding issue and on July 19, 1993, Deputy
National Security Advisor, Sandy Berger, approved a final draft of PRD
13.294 In the words of Ivo Daalder, PRD 13 "was a forceful endorsement
of multilateral peace operations. 295
While NSD 74 had simply endorsed the contribution of unique military
capabilities, PRD 13 "envision[ed] the United States... taking part in any
peacekeeping operations in any capacity., 296 It was at this final stage of the
drafting process that UNITAF, the American-led operation in Somalia,
began to spin out of control.297 Four months after Berger approved

U.S. Participationin UnitedNations PeacekeepingActivities, HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on
Int'l Security,Int 'l Orgs., andHuman Rights, 103d Cong., 21 (1994) (statement ofAmb. Madeleine
Albright).
288. Prior to the signature and promulgation of a PDD, a PRD is signed and undergoes an
extensive review by an inter-agency working group.
289. See Sorenson, supranote 258, at 116.
290. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Colin Powell reportedly remarked, "As long as I
am Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, I will not agree to commit American men and women to
an unknown war, in an unknown land, for an unknown cause, under an unknown commander, for
an unknown duration." Ivo H. Daalder, U.S. Policyfor Peacekeeping, in U.N. PEACEKEEPING,
supra note 38, at 43.
291. Id. at 44.
292. Id.
293. Id.
294. Id. at 45.
295. Daalder, U.S. Policyfor Peacekeeping, in U.N. PEACEKEEPING, supra note 38, at 45.
296. Id.
297. Sorenson, supra note 258, at 116.
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PRD 13's final draft, eighteen Americans would lose their lives in the
October 3-4 Battle of Mogadishu.298
Images of a dead ranger being dragged through the streets of
Mogadishu infuriated the American public, forced a phased American
withdrawal from Somalia within six months, and sounded the death-knell
for PRD 13.299 Within three weeks, Ambassador Albright testified to the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee that it was "both necessary and
appropriate, in the wake of the tragic deaths of American servicemen in
Somalia, that we who make policy take stock., 300 A week after that,
Secretary of Defense Les Aspin telephoned National Security Advisor
Tony Lake and ordered a complete revision of PRD 13.301 Six months
later, President Clinton signed PDD 25, which represented a one-hundred
eighty degree turn from PRD 13. That document concludes by noting:
The U.S. cannot be the world's policeman. Nor can we ignore the
increase in armed ethnic conflicts, civil wars and the collapse of
governmental authority in some states-crises that individually and
cumulatively may affect U.S. interests. This policy is designed to
impose discipline on both the U.N. and the U.S. to make peace
operations a more effective instrument of collective security.30 2
C. U.S. Efforts to Improve African Peacekeeping Capabilities
One of the most positive developments in the evolution of American
peacekeeping doctrine has been a belief that with the proper assistance,
Africans can help keep the peace in Africa. This belief was based on an
understanding that with waning interests by the West in African peace
operations, enhanced African skills were critically needed. PDD 25
implicitly recognized the benefits of such operations when it noted, "the
U.S. will support efforts to improve regional organizations' peacekeeping
capabilities. 3 3

298. WEISS, supra note 39, at 66.
299. Id.

300. Daalder, US. Policyfor Peacekeeping,in U.N. PEACEKEEPING, supra note 38, at 57.
301.

Id.

302. PDD 25, supra note 268, at 813.
303. Id. at 804.
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1. ACRI, ACOTA, & GPOI
During an October 1996 visit to Africa, Secretary of State Warren
Christopher traveled the continent in an effort to garner support for a
10,000 strong African Crisis Response Force (ACRF), which would later
evolve into the African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI). 3 ' ACRI was
not meant to be a standing army, rather, the goal was the creation of a
joint, rapid reaction force composed of well-equipped and well-trained
African peacekeeping troops stationed in their own country but ready for
rapid deployment to crisis areas in Africa. 3 5 This goal would be achieved
by American military personnel and private contractors training various
African militaries in peacekeeping and in humanitarian operations.3 °6
While certainly not a "magic bullet," to controlling Africa's
devastating conflicts, ACRI was a positive first step. In the first five years,
it conducted battalion-level training in eight3" 7 African nations.30 8 Each of
these nations was provided with training on the full range of Chapter VI
peacekeeping missions, including convoy escorts, logistics, and protection
of refugees and IDP's (intemally displaced persons).30 9 Each training
exercise consisted of an HIV/AIDS awareness module310 and human rights
304. Adekeye Adebajo & Michael O'Hanlon, Africa, TowardA Rapid Reaction Force, 17
SAIS REv. 153 (1997). The ACRF was the product of three interrelated factors. First, the
unwillingness of the United States to become directly involved in African peace operations,
stemming largely from the debacle in Somalia. Second, a preference by African states to resolve
their own problems and minimize external influence in African affairs. Third, the rise of subregional hegemons in the 1990s provided the impetus for African regional organizations to
undertake peace operations. See Terry M. Mays, African Solutionsfor African Problems: The
ChangingFaceofAfrican-MandatedPeace Operations,23 J. CONFLICT STUD. 2 (2003); Rocklyn
Williams, Challengesfor South andSouthern Africa: TowardsNon-ConsensualPeace Missions?,
in FROM PEACEKEEPING TO COMPLEX EMERGENCIES: PEACE SUPPORT MISSIONS IN AFRICA 155-56
(Jakkie Cilliers & Greg Mills eds., 1999) [hereinafter FROM PEACEKEEPING].
305. COMMONWEALTH PARLIAMENTARY Assoc. CONFERENCE, DATA PAPER 5: AFRICAN
CRISIS RESPONSE INITIATIVE (ACRI) A PEACEKEEPING ALLIANCE IN AFRICA (2003), availableat
http://www.cpahq.org/uploadstore/docs/5.pdf (last visited Oct. 30, 2006).
306. African Crisis Response Initiative: A Security Building Block, Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Africa of the Comm. on Int'l Relations, 107th Cong. 6 (2001) [hereinafter Royce
Statement] (statement of the Hon. Edward R. Royce, Chairman of the Subcomm.).
307. Those eight nations included: Senegal, Uganda, Malawi, Mali, Ghana, Benin, Cote
d'Ivoire, and Kenya. African CrisisResponse Initiative:A Security BuildingBlock, HearingBefore
the Subcomm. on Africa of the Comm. on Int'l Relations, 107th Cong. 12 (2001) [hereinafter
Bellamy Testimony] (statement of William M. Bellamy, Principal Deputy Assistant Sec'y, Bureau
of African Affairs, U.S. Dep't of State).
308. Id.
309. Id.
310. For the importance of HIV/AIDS training in peace operations, see infra text
accompanying notes 425-27.
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was an integral part of all training conducted.31' The greatest shortcoming
with ACRI was that it neither covered training for Chapter VII peace
12
operations, nor did it provide lethal equipment to African militaries.
Efforts to improve African peacekeeping capabilities increased
significantly under the Bush Administration, which recognizes a distinct
link between stability in Africa and the fight against global terrorism.313

311.
312.
313.
"America

Bellamy Testimony, supra note 307, at 12.
Royce Statement, supranote 306, at 8.
The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, implicitly notes that
is now threatened less by conquering states than we are by failing ones." NATIONAL
SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 1 (2002). It goes on to note:
In Africa, promise and opportunity sit side by side with disease, war, and
desperate poverty. This threatens both a core value of the United
States-preserving human dignity-and our strategic priority--combating global
terror. American interests and American principles, therefore, lead in the same
direction: we will work with others for an African continent that lives in liberty,
peace, and growing prosperity. Together with our European allies, we must help
strengthen Africa's fragile states, help build indigenous capability to secure porous
borders, and help build up the law enforcement and intelligence infrastructure to
deny havens for terrorists.
Id. at 10-11. Similarly, in a hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on September 28,
2005, EUCOM's (European Command) General Jones told the Committee that Africa remains a
priority for the U.S. military because conflict, poverty, disease, and terrorism on the continent "will
continue to directly affect our homeland security." GLOBALSECURITY.ORG, SENATE LEARNS OFU.S.
MILITARY PARTNERSHIPS IN AFRICA (2005), at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/
news/2005/10/mil-051007-usia0l.htm (last visited Oct. 30, 2006). In a May 2006 interview, the
new deputy commander of EUCOM, Army General William "Kip" Ward, further linked the war
on terrorism to stability in African nations. In an interview with American Forces Press Service he
explained:
In each of those locations, we are working with the nations within the region to
ensure that information is available so that they can do their part in helping to
prosecute this long war, as well as doing things on the ground with the armies,
navies, air forces, marine forces of other countries to help them become better
capable to do what they want to do, which is to bring stability to their regions.
Kathleen T. Rhem, EUCOMDeputy Shows Supportfor Democracy, Economic Stability Efforts,
AM. FORCES PRESS SERV. June 1, 2006. In July 2006 General Ward also paid a visit to three West
African nations and signed a "cross-servicing agreement," which will allow U.S. military forces
to provide logistical and medical support. See Staying Engagedin Africa, ARMY TIMES, Aug. 21,
2006, at 6. Perhaps most significantly, on February 6, 2007 Secretary of Defense Gates announced
that the Pentagon will establish a new combatant command to oversee operations in Africa.
Currently the African continent falls under both U.S. European Command and Central Command.
See, e.g., Jeff Schogol, PentagonAims to Streamline Operationsin Africa, STARS & STRIPES, Feb.
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Under the Bush administration, ACRI was transformed into the ACOTA
(African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance Program). Like
its predecessor, ACOTA continues to focus on enhancing traditional
peacekeeping skills. Unlike its predecessor, ACOTA incorporates Chapter
VII peace enforcement training. Its five main objectives include:
" Train and equip African militaries to respond to peace support
and complex humanitarian requirements
* Build and enhance sustainable African peace support training
capacity
" Build effective command and control
" Promote commonality and interoperability
" Enhance international, regional and sub-regional peace and
support capacity in Africa.314
A 2005 report by the Henry L. Stimson Center provides an excellent
overview of the ACOTA training methodology and objectives:
The ACOTA Program of Instruction is a collection of training
modules sanctioned by the U.N. [DPKO]. Each partner country
selects a course of instruction tailored to its specific needs and
capabilities. Lethal training can be incorporated at the recipient
country's request.... Command and staff training is done using
computer simulation, and seeks to improve interoperability in
multinational deployments. . . . Training is conducted in three
phases over an 18-month period. The first phase of training is
performed by U.S. trainers in the host country. The second phase is
conducted jointly by U.S. trainers and previously trained forces
from phase one. The third phase is led almost entirely by the
recipient country trainers, with U.S. personnel serving as
advisers.315

7, 2007, at 5. AFRICOM's primary mission will be to prevent crises, rather than war fighting.
President Bush has explained the new command, to be established by September 30, 2008, would
"strengthen our security cooperation with Africa and create new opportunities to bolster the
capabilities of our partners in Africa." David Stout, U.S. to Create Single Commandfor Military
Operations in Africa, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 2007, at A4.
314. DARA FRANCIS & MOIRA SHANAHAN, HENRY L. STIMSON CENTER, U.S. SUPPORT TO

THE ACOTA PROGRAM 1 (2005), available at
http://www.stimson.org/fopo/pdf/ACOTABrief FinalFeb05.pdf (last visited Oct. 30, 2006).
315. Id. at 3-4.
AFRICAN CAPACITY FOR PEACE OPERATIONS:
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ACOTA has trained more than 17,000 African soldiers from ten
countries and trainees from Senegal, Ghana, Kenya, Ethiopia, and Malawi,
have taken their skills and applied them to U.N. peace operations.3 16 From
FY 1997-FY3 172005 the United States spent $121 million on
ACRI/ACOTA.
U.S. assistance to African peacekeeping capabilities underwent a third
modification in 2004. At the 2004 G8 summit at Sea Island, Georgia, the
United States and Italy co-sponsored GPOI (Global Peace Operations
Initiative). 1 8 GPOI is a five-year program with the ambitious goals of
training and equipping 75,000 '9 troops in Africa, Asia, Latin America, and
the Caribbean, establishing a gendarme (constabulary) school in Vincenza,
Italy, and "fostering an international deployment and logistics support
system to transport peacekeepers to the field and maintain them there."32
GPOI's price-tag is $660 million and it will absorb ACOTA.3"' The idea
for GPOI was a joint effort between the DOD's Office of Special
Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict (SO/LIC) and the State
Department.322
2. PSI & TSCTI
Another American program which provides training to African
militaries is the PSI (Pan Sahe13 23 Initiative). PSI was initiated in
November 2002. As the State Department Office of Counter-terrorism
explains, "PSI is a State-led effort to assist Mali, Niger, Chad, and
Mauritania in detecting and responding to suspicious movement of people

316. Id. at3.
317. NINA M. SERAFINO, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS: THE GLOBAL PEACE OPERATIONS
INITIATIVE: BACKGROUND AND ISSUE FOR CONGRESS 1 (2005), availableat http://www.fas.org/

sgp/crs/misc/RL32773.pdf (last visited Oct. 30, 2006).
318. See WHITE HOUSE, PRESIDENT SPEAKS TO THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY

(2004), at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/09/20040921-3.html.
319. Fifty thousand of the troops will be African. FRANCIS & SHANAHAN, supra note 314, at
4.
320. SERAFINO, supra note 317, at 3.
321. Id. at 1.
322. Id. at 4.
323. Sahel is an Arabic word meaning "border" or "margin." The Sahel is an ard
climatological zone running from the Atlantic Ocean to the Horn of Africa. The Sahel consists of
some forty-seven million people and nine African nations (Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Chad,
Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, and Senegal). See GLOBALSECURITY.ORG, PAN
SAHEL INITIATIVE, available at http:www.Globalsecurity.org/military/ops/pan-sahel.htm (last
visited Oct. 30, 2006).
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and goods across and within their borders through training, equipment and
cooperation. '3 2 4 The enhanced skills these nations receive through PSI's
training, which focuses on basic marksmanship, communications, land
navigation, patrolling, and medical care, clearly have applicability to
performing in peace operations. 25 In 2004, PSI became the TSCTI (TransSahara Counter Terrorism Initiative).2 6 It has since expanded to Algeria,
Morocco, Nigeria, and Tunisia.32 7
V. AFRICAN SOLUTIONS TO AFRICAN PROBLEMS: THE ROLE OF
AFRICAN REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN PEACE OPERATIONS

Africa has a right and a duty to intervene to root out tyranny...
we must all accept that we cannot abuse the concept of national
sovereignty to deny the rest of the continent the right and duty to
intervene when behind those sovereign boundaries, people are
being slaughtered to protect tyranny.
Nelson Mandela328
A. Regionalism as a Concept
The concept of regionalism is derived from the idea of synergy. States
have come to a realization that by acting collectively, in concert with other
like-minded states, they stand a better chance of providing for their own
security than if they chose to act alone. This paradigm has been strongly
encouraged by the United States.329 Although regionalism generally
denotes cooperation among states in a specific geographic area, the

324. DEP'T OF STATE, OFFICE OF COUNTERTERRORISM, PAN SAHEL INITIATIVE (2002), at
http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/other/14987.htm (last visited Oct. 30, 2006). See also JASON
BEAUBIEN, NATIONAL PUBLIC j{ADIO, THE U.S. MILITARY'S GROWING ROLE IN AFRICA (Oct. 11,

2004), at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=4079474.
325. PHILLIP ULMER, AM. FORCES INFO. SERV., SPECIAL FORCES SUPPORT PAN SAHEL
INITIATIVE IN AFRICA, (Mar. 8, 2004), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Mar2004/
n03082004_200403085.html (last visited Oct. 30, 2006).
326. FRANCIS & SHANAHAN, supra note 314, at 5.
327. BEAUBIEN, supra note 324.
328. Address of the President of the Republic of South Africa, Nelson Mandela, to the Summit
Meeting of the OAU Heads of State and Government, Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso, June 8, 1998,
availableathttp://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/history/mandela/1 998/sp980608.html (last visited Oct.
30, 2006).
329. See supra Part IV.C.
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absence of a shared geographical space does not preclude the existence of
a regional security organization.33 ° Indeed, both the Covenant of the
League of Nations33 ' and Chapter VIII of the U.N. Charter33 chose to
avoid precise definitions or the fulfillment of particular conditions, so as
to allow states flexibility in creating instruments to maintain international
peace and security.33 3 Thus, "while the common sense notion of a region
is related to geography, the ambiguity of the Charter means that it can also
be conceived334 geographically, culturally, ideologically, and
economically."
The United Nations has long recognized the value that regional
organizations can play in the maintenance of peace and security. Chapter
VII of the U.N. Charter provides a broad mandate for the interaction
between regional organizations and the United Nations in collective
security. 335 Article 53(1) expressly provides that the Security Council may
employ regional organizations for peace operations, provided that the
operation is first authorized by the Security Council. 33 6 In his heady 1992
Agenda for Peace, Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali echoed the
important role regional organizations can play, while noting the Security
Council's primacy in the maintenance of international peace and security:

330. See Mark Malan, Debunking Some Myths About Peacekeeping in Africa, in FROM
supra note 304, at 9.
331. See Article 21, which states, "Nothing in this Covenant shall be deemed to affect the
validity of international engagements, such as treaties of arbitration or regional understandings...
for securing the maintenance of peace." League of Nations Covenant art. 21.
332. See Article 52(1), which states, "Nothing in the present Charter precludes the existence
of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of
international peace and security... provided ... their activities are consistent with the Purposes
and Principles of the United Nations." U.N. Charter art. 52, 1.
333. See David Jividen, It Takes a Region: A Proposalforan AlternativeRegionalApproach
to UN. Collective Forcein HumanitarianIntervention, 10 USAFA AcAD. J. LEGAL STUD. 109.125
(1999).
334. Id. (quoting S. Neil McFarlane & Thomas G. Weiss, The United Nations, Regional
PEACEKEEPING,

Organizations,and Human Security, in REGIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES AND THE UNITED NATIONS

SYSTEM 19-20 (Academic Council on U.N. Systems (ACUNS), 1994)).
335. See, e.g., Prevention of Armed Conflict, Report of the Secretary-General,U.N. Doc.
A/55/985-S/2001/574, 138 (June 7, 2001) [hereinafter Prevention ofArmed Conflict].
336. U.N. Charter art. 53, para. 1. Article 53(1) reads in part, "The Security Council shall,
where appropriate, utilize such regional arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under its
authority. But no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional
agencies without the authorization of the Security Council ... " As the Charter was written well
before the paralyzing effects of the Cold War set in, it does not delineate what measures may be
taken in the event that the Security Council is unable to act (whether because of a threat of a veto
or simply because it fails to deal with an issue in a timely manner). Again, the Responsibility to
Protect offers a sensible solution for bridging the gap.
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Regional organizations or agencies in many cases possess a
potential that should be utilized in serving the functions covered in
this report: preventive diplomacy, peace-keeping, peacemaking and
post-conflict peace building. Under the Charter, the Security
Council has and will continue to have a primary responsibility for
maintaining international peace and security, but regional action as
a matter of decentralization, delegation, and cooperation with
United Nations efforts could not only lighten the burden of the
Council, but also contribute to a deeper sense of participation,
consensus, and democratization of international affairs.33 7
To promote cooperation and increased efficiency in peace operations,
regional organizations, and the United Nations have held biennial meetings
since 1994."' 8 In 1998, the United Nations established the U.N. Liaison
Office at OAU headquarters in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.33 9 As the
Prevention ofArmed Conflict Report by the Secretary-General explains,
"[the Liaison Office] constituted a first step in promoting cooperation,
prevention strategies, with regional or subregional
including on conflict
' 34
organizations. 0
Compared to the United Nations, regional security organizations offer
distinct benefits in peace operations. Foremost, regional organizations are
generally more qualified to cope with cultural aspects of a dispute because
of their proximity to the conflict. 34' Consequently, regional organizations
may be viewed as more palatable to governments wary of outside
intervention. For example, in the recent deployment of peacekeepers by
the AU (African Union) to Darfur, the AU was "recognized as the only
force likely to be acceptable to the government of Sudan. 3 42 Indeed, as the
U.N. Report entitled Prevention of Armed Conflict notes, "Regional
organizations. . . .build trust among States through the frequency of
interaction, and have a greater grasp of the historical background of a
conflict. Because of their proximity, regional organizations could...

337. Supplement to Agenda for Peace, supranote 7, 1 64.
137-39.
338. Prevention ofArmed Conflict, supra note 335,
339. Id. 59.
340. Id.
341. See, e.g., Jividen, supra note 333, at 130 (quoting Sabina Lautensach, U.N. and
Peacekeeping:An Evolving Concept, 13 PEACE RES. REvS. 35 (1994)).
342. African Organizationsand Institutions:Positive Cross-ContinentalProgress,Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on African Affairs, Senate ForeignRelations Comm., 109th Cong. 8 (Nov.
17, 2005) [hereinafter Holt Testimony] (statement of Victoria K. Holt, Senior Assoc., Henry L.
Stimson Center).
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promote and facilitate a comprehensive regional approach to cross-border
'
issues."343
Critics argue that the role regional organizations can play in peace
operations are untenable and in the final analysis create more problems
than they solve. Nonetheless, many of the "weaknesses" advanced by such
critics can be debunked.
First is the claim that there are few regional organizations which have
the military, financial, and organizational skills to undertake a complex
peace operation. This is certainly true of both the African Union (AU) and
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). 3" Nonetheless,
this is not as problematic as critics suggest for the simple reason that a lack
of resources can always be compensated for; a lack of political will
cannot.345 A glance at the UNDPKO's figures on troop and fund
contributions clearly demonstrate that Western powers are willing to fund
operations provided that they are not responsible for putting boots on the
ground. Other innovative ideas at bridging the resource gap have been
suggested. One scholar, for example, has suggested that regional troops
have access to pre-positioned U.N. owned equipment.346
A second concern is that regional organizations will be less effective
in peace operations than the United Nations because they do not possess
impartiality and universality, strengths generally associated with U.N.
operations.347 Nevertheless, as Anna Roberts notes, "the extent to which
these two qualities are guaranteed in U.N. peacekeeping is easily
' While a lack of impartiality would doom a traditional
overstated."348
peacekeeping operation, as the UK's Joint Warfare Publication 3-50
makes clear, the "Trinity" is of little consequence in a Chapter VII peace
operation. With regard to universality, as has been demonstrated, the

343. Prevention ofArmed Conflict, supranote 335, 137.
344. Holt Testimony, supranote 342, at 1-4 (In short, there is a striking contrast between the
AU and ECOWAS willingness to deploy troops and their capacity to plan and support such
deployments.).
345. Echoing this, Iqbal Riza, Annan's Chief of Staff, noted in an interview, "It comes back
to political will. If the political will is there, yes, anything can be done. If the political will is there,
troops, APCs, . . . and tanks can be airlifted in a matter of two days." FRONTLINE, PUBLIC
BROADCASTING SYSTEM, THE TRIUMPH OF EVIL, INTERVIEW WITH IQBAL RIZA, available at

http://www.pbs.org/wgbhlpages/frontline/shows/evil/interviews/riza.html (last visited Feb. 26,
2007).
346. See, e.g., J. Matthew Vaccaro, The Politics of Genocide: Peacekeepingand Rwanda, in
U.N. PEACEKEEPING, supra note 38, at 401-02.
347. Roberts, supra note 8, at 889.

348. Id.
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overwhelming number of U.N.
peacekeepers from the Third World belies
3 49
universality.
of
sense
any true
A third concern is that a regional or sub-regional organization will be
dominated by a single hegemon who will use the organization to advance
its own foreign policy agenda. Critics often cite Nigeria's unparalleled
dominance within ECOWAS and the predominant role it took in the
intervention in Liberia in 1990 or for a non-African example, the United
States in NATO.350 Nonetheless, such an argument is unpersuasive because
there is no single African military which dominates the AU or ECOWAS
to the extent that the United States dominates NATO. Moreover, as most
African nations receive international aid in one form or another, an African
hegemon's actions are more easily subject to curtailment by public and
international approval. As Mary Durfee and James Rosenau have
suggested, "Hegemons would not last long if they had to apply raw power
at every turn. It is far better that they find ways of legitimating their power
so that others will accept it more readily."35 '
B. African Regional OrganizationsandPeace Operations
A number of regional and sub-regional African organizations are
involved in conflict management in Africa. In fact, the exact number may
never be known because there are several ad hoc coalitions involved in
conflict prevention and dispute resolution.352 Five organizations, however,
are especially important: the AU (formerly the Organization of African
Unity or (OAU)); the ECOWAS; the Southern African Development
Community (SADC) 353 the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD);356 and the Accord de Non Aggression et d'Assistance en

349. Id. See also supra text accompanying note 256.
350. Mays, supra note 304, at 113.
351. Id. at 112 (quoting Mary Durfee & James N. Rosenau, THINKING THEORY THOROUGHLY
148 (2000)).
352. Alao, supranote 13.
353. The forerunner to the SADC, the South African Development Co-Ordination Conference
(SADCC), was formed in 1980 by the Southern African states of Angola, Botswana, Lesotho,
Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. The SADCC was formed
primarily with the objective of reducing Member States' dependence on the apartheid regime in
South Africa. See South African Development Community, Origins, at http://www.sadc.int/
english/about/history/index.php (last visited Feb. 27, 2007).
354. Formed in 1986, IGAD's objectives have significantly broadened over time. Originally
composed of the six African nations of Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Sudan, and Uganda,
IGAD's initial objective was to combat the effects ofdrought and desertification. In 1996, however,
with most of its members battling their own security problems, the heads of IGAD amended the
charter to cover conflict resolution. See DEP'T OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA,
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Mati~re de Defence (ANAD).355 As only the first two have developed
formal mechanisms with peace and security responsibilities, as well as put
boots on the ground in African conflicts, they are considered in more detail
below.
1. African Union
African heads of state established the OAU on May 25, 1963.356 The
OAU's five stated purposes evince a decidedly state-centric view.357
Indeed, as one African scholar has written, "[w]hile the U.N. charter opens
with a people-focused declaration 'we the peoples of the world', the OAU
charter begins with 'We the Heads of States of African Counties.... ,,358
This state-centric view would have important ramifications on the
organization's willingness to become involved in peace operations.
Although the OAU was the first African organization to undertake a
peacekeeping operation on the continent (the controversial and disastrous
dispatch of peacekeepers to Chad),35 9 such participation was limited to
inter-state conflicts as the OAU's Charter expressly forbid intervention in
a member's internal conflicts.36 °
(IGAD), at http://www.dfa.gov.za/foreign/
Multilateral/africa/igad.htm (last visited Feb. 27, 2007).
355. Formed in 1977 with the goal of promoting security in order to enhance economic
development, ANAD initially consisted of seven Francophone nations: Burkina Faso, Mali,
Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, the Ivory Coast, and Togo. Alao, supra note 13.
356. See Organization of African Unity (OAU) Charter, available at http:www.oaucreation.com/OAU%20Charter.htm (last visited Feb. 27, 2007).
357. See, e.g., id. art. II, 1.
358. Alao, supra note 13.
359. Toward the end of the 1970s, Chad became involved in a complex civil war, with as
many as ten groups fighting. Ali A. Mazrui & Robert L. Ostergard, Jr., From Pax Europato Pax
INTERGOVERNMENTAL AUTHORITY ON DEVELOPMENT

Africana, in THE CAUSES OF WAR AND THE CONSEQUENCES OF PEACEKEEPING IN AFRICA 28

(Ricardo Ren6 Laremont ed., 2002). For the OAU to intervene at this stage would have been to act
in contravention of the Charter. Nevertheless, once Libya signaled its intentions of intervening so
as to achieve "full unity" with Chad, the conflict took on an inter-state quality and the OAU agreed
to send a peacekeeping force in 1981. Id.The mission was a complete disaster. Poorly planned and
supported, the operation suffered from a grossly inadequate number of troops, resulting in the
Chadian government using the OAU peacekeepers as human shields in assaults on the rebels. Mays,
supra note 304, at 113. By 1982, rebel factions had seized control of N'Djamena, the capital city,
and the OAU had withdrawn. Id.at 114. One scholar notes that the Chad debacle "would haunt the
organization for many years to come." Alao, supranote 13, at 7. Despite small observer missions,
the OAU would not again return to complex peace operations, leaving a vacuum which would be
filled by ambitious sub-regional organizations such as ECOWAS. Mays, supra note 304, at 114.
360. OAU Charter, art. III, para. 2 ("The Member States, in pursuit of the purposes stated in
Article II solemnly affirm and declare their adherence to the following principles ...2. Noninterference in the internal affairs of States.").
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During the Cold War, the OAU came to be viewed as more concerned
with propping up brutal dictators than protecting the rights of African
citizens and was derisively dubbed "the dictator's club." 36' With the end
of the Cold War and the explosion of ghastly intra-state conflicts in
Angola, Somalia, Rwanda, the Congo, the Sudan, and Sierra Leone, a
conceptual shift began to emerge against the OAU's state-centric raison
d'etre. As Jennifer Cooke has testified, "a new consensus
began to emerge
3 62
around the paradigm of human- versus state-security.
This consensus eventually led to the transformation of the OAU into
the African Union (AU).363 Modeled after the European Union,3 6' the AU
represents a seismic shift in African thinking. Gone are the state-centric
principles of non-intervention 365 and Westphalian sovereignty.3 66 The AU

361. See, e.g., News24.com, Key Post for Konare in AU, at http://www.news24.com/News24/
Africa/News/0,,2-11-1447_1384498,00. html (last visited Feb. 27, 2007).
362. African Organizationsand Institutions. Positive Cross-ContinentalProgress,Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on African Affairs, Senate Foreign Relations Comm., 109th Cong. 1 (Nov.
17, 2005) [hereinafter Cooke Testimony] (statement of Jennifer Cooke, Co-Director, Africa
Program, Ctr. For Strategic and Int'l Studies).
363. Four summits led to the birth of the AU: the 1999 Sirte Expeditionary Session launched
the initial concept of the AU: the 2000 Lomd Summit adopted the Constitutive Act or charter; the
2001 Lusaka Summit charted the road map for the AU's implementation; and the 2002 Durban
Summit officially launched the AU and convened the First Assembly of the Heads of States. See
African Union, African Union in a Nutshell, Advent of the AU [hereinafter AU in a Nutshell], at
http://www.africa-union.org/AboutAU/auin_a_nutshell.htm (last visited Feb. 27, 2007). All
African states are members with the exception of Morocco, who opposes the membership of the
Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic. See, e.g., AFROL News, SOUTH AFRICA RECOGNIZES
SAHRAWI REPUBLIC, at http://www.afrol.com/articles/13959 (last visited Feb. 27, 2007).

364. A Pan African Parliament opened on March 18, 2004 in Midrand, South Africa,
composed of elected representatives from forty-one of the fifty-three Member States. African
Union, The Organs of the AU, The Pan-African Parliament, at http://www.africaunion.org/root/au/organs/Pan-AfricanParliament-en.htm (last visited Feb. 27, 2007). The longterm goal is to evolve into an institution with full legislative powers. Id. For the time being, the
Parliament only has consultative and advisory powers.
365. Article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act states: "The Union shall function in accordance with
the following principles: (h) the right of the Union to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a
decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide and
crimes against humanity." African Union, About AU, Constitutive Act, http://www.africaunion.org/root/au/AboutAu/Constitutive Act en.htm (last visited Feb. 27, 2007).
366. One of the most striking dissimilarities between the OAU and the AU is the latter's
refusal to sit quietly on the sidelines, as was the policy of its predecessor, when a coup occurs. For
example, when President Gnassingbe Eyadema, the President of Togo, died on February 5, 2005
and the military, ignoring the Togolese Constitution, installed his son Faur6 as President, the AU
acted swiftly, imposing diplomatic, travel, and arms sanctions on Togo. See, e.g., Lydia Polgreen,
WestAfrica Wins Again, with Twist, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 2005, at A8. As a result, on February 25,
2005, Faur6 stepped down. As the New York Times reported: "The swift reversal was one result of
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takes a decidedly people-centric approach to African affairs, as is
evidenced by its fourteen objectives.3 67 As the Assistant Secretary of State
for African Affairs testified in November 2005, "[t]he emergence of an
activist African Union (AU) [with a] modem, forward-looking agenda is
'
one of the most important developments on the continent in decades."368
The AU also counts the "promot[ion of] peace, security, and stability
on the continent" as one of its objectives3 69 and has already deployed
troops in two peace operations.370 The first fully manned peace operation
undertaken by the AU in Africa was the African Mission in Burundi
(AMIB), occurring in April 2003, following the Arusha Agreement for
"'
Peace and Reconciliation for Burundi, Rwanda's southern neighbor.37
AMIB's objectives included overseeing of the ceasefire agreements,
supporting DDR efforts, contributing to the political and economic
stability of Burundi, and most importantly, stabilizing the country for a
U.N. follow-on peacekeeping force.372 At the height of its yearlong
operation, AMIB comprised more than 3,300 troops, with South Africa,
Ethiopia, and Mozambique providing the majority of forces.3 73 In 2004,
AMIB transitioned to ONUB (United Operation in Burundi) per Security
Council Resolution 1545. 374

a new phenomenon: African leaders and institutions showing stiff resolve and complete unity....
ECOWAS and the African Union were quick and merciless in their condemnation, and worked
from the first day of Mr. Gnassingbe's rule to push him from power." Id.
367. Among its objectives, the AU lists the following: "promot[ion] of democratic principles
and institutions, popular participation and good governance"; the "promot[ion] and protect[ion of]
human and peoples' rights in accordance with . . . relevant human rights instruments"; the
"promot[ion] of sustainable development"; the "promot[ion of] co-operation in all fields of human
activity to raise the living standards of African peoples"; and "the eradication of preventable
diseases and the promotion of good health on the continent." AU in a Nutshell, supra note 363.
368. African Organizationsand Institutions:Positive Cross-ContinentalProgress,Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on African Affairs, Senate ForeignRelations Comm., 109th Cong. 1 (Nov.
17, 2005) [hereinafter Frazer Testimony] (statement of Jendayi E. Frazer, Assistant Sec'y of State
for African Affairs).
369. AU in a Nutshell, supra note 363.
370. See infra notes 371-93 and accompanying text.
371. See Victoria K. Holt & Moira K. Shanahan, African Capacity-Building for Peace
Operations: U.N. Collaboration with the African Union and ECOWAS 40 (2005), availableat
http://www.stimson.org/fopo/pdf/AfricanCapacity-building.pdf (last visited Feb. 27, 2007).
372. Festus Aboagye, TheAfrican Missionin Burundi: Lessons Learnedform the FirstAfrican
Union PeacekeepingOperation,2 CONFLICT TRENDs 9, 10 (2004), availableat http://www.iss.co.
za/pubs/Other/CT2_2004%20PG9-15.pdf (last visited Feb. 27, 2007).
373. Holt Testimony, supra note 342, at 3-4.
374. See S.C. Res. 1545, U.N. SCOR, 4975th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1545 (May 21, 2004).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol19/iss1/3

70

Hollywood: It Takes a Village…or at Least a Region: Rethinking Peace Operati

2007]

IT TAKES.A VILLAGE... OR AT LEAST A REGION: RETHINKING PEACE OPERATIONS

145

The AU undertook its second peace operation in the Darfur region of
Sudan in 2004 and continues as of this writing. Darfur is located in
Western Sudan and is the country's largest region. The conflict in Sudan
is enormously complex and has deep historical roots. Generally, it is one
fought between the ethnic-Arab dominated government and ethnic-African
populations located in the South and West.375 Fighting intensified in 2003,
however, when, according to Human Rights Watch:
two rebel groups, the Sudan Liberation Army/Movement (SLA/M)
and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) ...

demanded an

end to chronic economic marginalization and sought power-sharing
within the Arab-ruled Sudanese state. They also sought government
action to end the abuses of their rivals, Arab pastoralists who were
driven onto African farmlands by drought and desertification-and
who had a nomadic tradition of armed militias.376
Since 2003, the Sudanese government and its "Janjaweed" partner (Arab
militias armed by the government) have intentionally targeted civilians,
killing upwards of 300,000 civilians and internally displacing two million
people, prompting NGOs, the U.S. Congress, and former U.S. Secretary
of State, Colin Powell, to conclude that the government was committing
genocide.377
A peace agreement was signed by the parties on January 9, 2005.378
Yet, even with the peace agreement signed, the government and its
Janjaweed allies have continued to target civilians and humanitarian
workers at IDP camps. When it became clear that the international
community did not have the political will to intervene in Darfur to stop the
killing, the AU acted. On May 28, 2004 it established a Ceasefire
Commission (CFC) and deployed a small number of troops to monitor the
CFC.379 Two months later the AU announced that the number of military

375. See, e.g., INT'LINST. FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES, THE MILITARY BALANCE, 2005-2006 360
(2005) [hereinafter MILITARY BALANCE].
376.

HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, DARFUR DESTROYED: ETHNIC CLEANSING BY GOVERNMENT

AND MILITIA FORCES IN WESTERN SUDAN, 1 (May 2004) [hereinafter HRW Darfur Report],

available at http://hrw.org/reports/2004/sudan0504/sudan05O4simple.pdf (last visited Feb. 27,
2007).
377. Id.; see also MILITARY BALANCE, supranote 375, at 360; Q&A: Sudan'sDarfurConflict,
BBCNEwS, May 26,2005, availableat http://news.bbc.co.uk/Il/hi/world/africa/3496731 .stm (last
visited Feb. 27, 2007).
378. MILITARY BALANCE, supranote 375, at 360.
379. See WILLIAM G. O'NEILL& VIOLETTE CASSIS, THE BROOKINGS INST., PROTECTING TWO
MILLION INTERNALLY DISPLACED: THE SUCCESSES AND SHORTCOMINGS OF THE AFRICAN UNION
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observers would be increased and African soldiers would also be deployed
to protect them. The first battalion, comprising 680 Nigerian forces,
deployed on July 13, 2005.380 In order to avoid offending the Sudanese
government, AMIS (African Union Mission in Sudan) was referred to as
a "ceasefire monitoring mission" rather than a peace operation.38' Within
three months the number of AU "monitors" had grown to 3,320, 2,341 of
which were military.3 82 As of this writing, the mission has grown to nearly
7,000 personnel,
and Darfur has become a "test case for African
383
peacekeeping."
Since the deployment, the AU has faced enormous challenges in
Darfur. Inadequate number of troops, poor mission planning, a weak
mandate, and limited supplies and equipment have all led to what one
columnist has referred to as a "downward spiral. 384 While a report
released by the Brookings Institute at the end of 2005 clearly
acknowledges the organization's many shortcomings, it argues that the
presence of the AU forces has deterred rapes, reduced recruitment of
children into the armed forces, reduced looting, and helped IDPs return
home. It ultimately concludes, however, that the AU alone is not up to the
task and should be transformed into a U.N. operation.385 Indeed, as of this
writing, and a year after the deployment of the AU's first battalion to
Darfur, Sudanese men, women, and children continue to be killed, raped,
conscripted, and driven from their homes at staggering rates.386 The
fighting also threatens to spill over into neighboring Chad and many areas
of Darfur have simply become too dangerous for even the most intrepid
relief workers.387 What is more, the AU forces have increasingly been
targeted by the government. In March 2006, Human Rights Watch
reported that the Sudanese government, initially supportive of the force,
"delayed the delivery of 105 armored personnel carriers, denied jet fuel
supplies to AU aircraft and painted government vehicles white to pass
them off as AU vehicles, thus endangering AU peacekeepers. 388

INDARFUR 16 (2005), availableat http://www.brookings.edu/fp/projects/idp/200511 _au darfur.
pdf(last visited Oct. 30, 2006)
380. MILITARY BALANCE, supra note 375, at 360.
381. Id.

382. Id. at 25.
383. O'NEILL & CASSIS, supra note 379, at 3; see also Holt Testimony, supra note 342, at 4.
384. Nicholas D. Kristof, A Tolerable Genocide, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 27, 2005, at 11.

385. See O'NEILL & CASSIS, supra note 379, at 69-70.
386. See, e.g., Reeves, supra note 128.
387. See, e.g., id.
388.

HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, AFRICAN UNION: SUPPORT U.N. PROTECTION FORCE FOR

DARFUR, Mar. 9,2006, availableat http://hrw.org/english/docs/2006/03/08/sudan 12785.htm (last
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As early as January 12, 2006, the AU consented, in theory, to the
handover to a U.N. force in the future.389 Six months later, the AU
Commission Chairman, Alpha Oumar Konare, publicly stated that "We
need to hand over the baton to the U.N ..... The AU today does not have
the resources to be there. . . .We don't have the capacity to face a
peacekeeping situation or an extended conflict. "390
Finally, on September 1, 2006, the U.N. Security Council approved a
resolution by a vote of 12-0, authorizing the deployment of up to 22,500
peacekeepers.39 ' Nonetheless, in a stunning about face, even by U.N.
standards, the Council agreed that the force may only be deployed with
Khartoum's consent, thereby wholly neglecting GA Resolution 60
codifying the "responsibility to protect" when national authorities fail.
Thus far, Khartoum's consent has been unavailing. Sudanese President
Omar el-Bashir has exhorted that Darfur would be the "graveyard" of
foreign troops and has sworn that "there will not be any international
military intervention in Darfur as long as I am in power."39' 2 El-Bashir's
last statement is particularly baffling when one considers that the U.N.
Mission in Sudan (UNMIS), a U.N. peacekeeping force, has operated in
Sudan with some 9,000 troops since March 2005. 3 9'
Primary responsibility for the AU's peace and security agenda lies with
the Peace and Security Council (PSC). 394 According to the Protocol
Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the
African Union,395 the PSC is "a collective security and early-warning
arrangement to facilitate timely and efficient response to conflict and crisis
situations in Africa., 396 Like the Security Council, the PSC is a "standing
decision-making organ" composed of fifteen elected members.3 97 Its
objectives span the entire spectrum of peace operations, from conflict
visited Feb. 27, 2007).
389. See, e.g., id.
390. Reeves, supra note 128.
391. See Glenn Kessler & Craig Timberg, Sudan Says No as U.N. Backs ForceFor Darfur,
WASH. POST, Sept. 1, 2006, at Al.
392. Backtrackingin Darfur;Sudan'sDictatorGets Nastier,WASH. POST, July 2, 2006, at B6;
see also HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 388.

393. See supra note 11.
394. See African Union, The Organs of the African Union, Protocol Relating To The
Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union [hereinafter Peace and
Security Protocol], athttp://www.africa-union.org/root/au/organs/psc/Protocol_peace%20and%20
security.pdf (last visited Feb. 27, 2007).

395. The Protocol was adopted by the First Ordinary Session of the Assembly ofthe African
Union on July 9, 2002. Id. art. 22(1).
396. Id. art. 2(1).
397. Id. arts. 2(1), 5(1).
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prevention to traditional peacekeeping to more complex peaceenforcement operations and post-conflict reconstruction.39 Throughout all
these operations, the PSC "is guided by the principles enshrined in the
AU's Constitutive Act, the Charter of the United Nations, and the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights.399 In discharging its duties, the
PSC is supported by several entities, including the Commission; 0 a Panel
of the Wise;4 " a Continental Early
Warning System; 40 2 an African Standby
4 3 and a Special Fund. 41
Force;
2. ECOWAS
Created in 1975, in order to promote economic cooperation and
integration, ECOWAS is currently composed of fifteen members. 4 5 As a
398. Id.art. 3(b-c).
399. Peace and Security Protocol, supranote 394, art. 4.
400. The Commission is the Secretariat of the AU and similar in many respects to the U.N.
Secretariat. See generally id. art. 10. The PSC should not be confused with the Peace Security
Directorate (PSD). The Commission established the PSD prior to ratification of the PSC in 2003.
Holt & Shanahan, supra note 371, at 17. The PSD contains a Conflict Management Division
(CMC), a Peace Support Operations Division, and a Secretariat to assist the PSC. See African
Union, Organs, The Commission, The Peace and Security Directorate, http://www.africaunion.org/root/au/organs/TheCommission-en.htm (last visited Oct. 30, 2006).
401. The Panel ofthe Wise acts has an advisory council and consists of "five highly respected
African personalities from various segments of society who have made outstanding contributions
to the cause of peace, security and development on the continent." See Peace & Security Protocol,
supra note 394, art. 11(2).
402. The Early Warning System falls under the PSD's CMC. Its purpose is to prevent and
facilitate responses to African conflicts. The Early Warning System consists of an observation and
monitoring center (the "Situation Room") as well as observation and monitoring units linked to the
Situation Room. See generally Peace and Security Protocol, supra note 394, art. 12(2)(a-b).
403. Approved in 2003, the African Standby Force (ASF) is comparable to the U.N. Standby
Arrangements System. Like UNSAS, the force is composed of on-call multidisciplinary forces,
stationed in their home countries and ready for rapid deployment. The ASF is expected to be able
to perform the entire spectrum of peace operations and by 2010, consist of five brigades (one for
each African subregion: North Africa, West Africa, East Africa, Central Africa, and Southern
Africa). See id. art. 13(3)(a-g). See also INST. FOR SEC. STUD.,JAKKIE CILLIERS, FROM DURBAN TO
MAPUTO: A REVIEW OF 2003 SuMMrr OF THE AFRICAN UNiON n.38 (2003), available at
http://www.sarpn.org.za/documents/d0000443/P425_ISS AU.pdf(last visited Oct. 30, 2006). In
support of the ASF, a Military Staff Committee (MSC), composed of Member States' senior
military officers, will also be established. Peace and Security Protocol, supra note 394, art. 13(8).
404. A Special Fund or "Peace Fund" is expected "to provide the necessary financial resources
for peace support missions and other operational activities related to peace and security." Peace and
Security Protocol, supra note 394, art. 21(2). The Peace Fund shall be funded from the AU's
budget, voluntary contributions from Member States, and private sector donations. Id.art. 21(2).
405. Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, C6ted'lvoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau,
Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Togo. Mauritania left the organization
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sub-regional organization, ECOWAS arguably has a greater interest in a
stable and peaceful West Africa, than the AU, which is largely an umbrella
organization that relies on sub-regional organizations to implement its
agenda.4 6 Although ECOWAS did not contain a defense clause at the time
of its founding, it has, more than any other sub-regional organization,
sought to fill the security vacuum left by the tepid OAU. Since 1990 it has
deployed peacekeeping forces to Liberia (in 1990 and 2003), Sierra Leone,
Guinea Bissau, and CMte d'Ivoire through ECOMOG.4 °7
In December 1999 ECOWAS promulgated its Protocolon Mechanism
for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution and Peacekeeping,
which provides the current framework for peace operations. 40 8 The
Protocol may be applied to a number of conflict situations, including

in 2002. See ECOWAS.info Web Site, Economic Community of West African States, at
http://www.ecowas.info/ (last visited Oct. 30, 2006).
406. Francis V. Crupi, Why the United States Should Robustly Support Pan-African
Organizations,35 PARAMETERS 106 (Winter 2005-2006), availableat http://www.carlisle.army.
mil/usawc/parameters/05winter/crupi.pdf (last visited Oct. 30, 2006).
407. ECOMOG is the ECOWAS Monitoring Group, a non-standing military force. The
impetus for ECOMOG was a request made to the community for military assistance by the Liberian
President. As Brigadier General Khobe, a former ECOMOG Commander in Sierra Leone recounts:
The Anglophone countries, led by Nigeria, were prepared to assist, while the
Francophone countries were opposed to military intervention.... On 7 August
1990... the Anglophone countries under the auspices of the ECOWAS Standing
Mediation Committee met.., and took a decision to send a military force to...
Liberia. The Francophone members of the Community... were opposed to the
...intervention.... The force was placed under the command of a Ghanaian
general, while the bulk of the land and naval forces and the entire air force was
contributed by Nigeria. There is considerable evidence that the U.S. supported the
initiative of the ECOWAS Standing Mediation Committee.
Mitikishe Maxwell Khobe, The Evolution and Conduct of ECOMOG Operations in West Africa,
44 MONOGRAPH (2000), availableat http://www.iss.co.za/Pubs/Monographs/No44/ECOMOG.html
(last visited Oct. 30, 2006). ECOWAS's first peace operation received decidedly mixed reviews.
On the plus side, it was an audacious example of African solutions to African problems and did
succeed in temporarily stopping the bloodshed. On the minus side, it was plagued by poor planning,
poor logistical support, and failed to integrate human rights protection into the operation. Indeed,
the troops themselves were roundly criticized for human rights violations and looting. In the words
of one American Congressman, "the Nigerian troops just became anarchist almost. They just
misbehaved tremendously. Lute Testimony, supra note 203, at 19 (comments of Congressman
Payne); see also Waging War to Keep the Peace: the ECOMOG Intervention and Human Rights,
5 HuM. RTs. WATCH (1993), availableat http://www.hrw.org/reports/1993/liberia/ (last visited Oct.
30,2006). See also Comfort Ero, The FutureofECOMOG in WestAfrica, in FROM PEACEKEEPING,
supra note 304, at 60.
408. Holt & Shanahan, supra note 371, at 21.
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conflict between Member States; internal conflicts that pose a threat to
peace and security in the subregion, serious violations of human rights, the
overthrow of a democratically elected government, and humanitarian
disasters.40 9 The Protocolalso provided for the creation of a Mediation and
Security Council4" 0 and a department in the Secretariat charged with peace
and security.41'
In June 2004, Lansana Kouyate, the Executive Secretary of ECOWAS
announced that a standing rapid reaction force would be created. The force
will retain the name ECOMOG and is similar in structure to the
UNSAS. 4 12 As Victoria Holt explains, the initial concept involves a force
of "1,500 rapidly deployable troops, followed by a brigade of 3,500 troops
for... prolonged missions, and 1,500 in reserve."4 3 Although this force
is still in its developmental stages, it clearly demonstrates ECOWAS's
continued intention of maintaining an influential role in peace operations
on the continent.
C. African Military Capabilitiesand ChallengesAhead
African militaries have extensive experience in U.N. peace operations
and on paper, many nations have impressive forces.4 14 The ten largest nonArab league 4 1 armies on the continent include Eritrea with 200,000

409. NICOLE BALL & KAYODE FAYEMI, SECURITY SECTOR GOVERNANCE IN AFRICA: A
HANDBOOK § 6.4.1 (2004).
410. The Council is comprised of Member States' Heads of State or Foreign Ministers. It is
charged with a number of tasks, including "implement[ing] policies designed to achieve conflict
prevention, resolution and peacekeeping; authorising [sic] all forms of intervention and [m]aking
decisions on the deployment of political and military missions and their mandates." Id. See also
Holt & Shanahan, supranote 37 1, at 22. The Council is supported by a number of other structures,
including a Defence and Security Commission, a Council of Elders, and the ECOWAS Ceasefire
Monitoring Group. Id.
411. Within the Secretariat, lead responsibility for peace and security is invested in the Office
of the Deputy Executive Secretary for Political Affairs, Defense and Security (DES-PADS). See

ECOWAS, Activities, Dep't of Peace and Sec., Org. DES-PADS, available at http://www.sec.
ecowas.int/index.html (last visited Sept. 1,2006). See also Holt & Shanahan, supranote 37 1, at 22.
DES-PADS has four supporting institutions: the office of political affairs, the office of
humanitarian assistance, the office of defense and security, and an observation and monitoring
center, which operates as a crisis early warning system. Id.at 23-24.
412. Global Policy Forum, West Africa Goes on Discussing Regional Rapid Reaction Force
(July 20, 2000), availableat http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/peacekpg/reform/ecowas.htm
(last visited Oct. 30, 2006); see also Mays, supra note 304, at 8.

413. Holt & Shanahan, supra note 371, at 25.
414. In 2005, thirty African nations contributed forces to U.N. peacekeeping operations. Holt
Testimony, supra note 342, at 2.
415. As African nations belonging to the Arab League are less likely to be involved in peace

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol19/iss1/3

76

Hollywood: It Takes a Village…or at Least a Region: Rethinking Peace Operati

2007]

IT TAKES A VILLAGE... OR AT LEAST A REGION: RETHINKING PEACE OPERATIONS

151

soldiers; Ethiopia with 180,000; Angola and Sudan with 100,000 soldiers
each; Nigeria with 62,000; the Democratic Republic of Congo with
60,000; Uganda and Burundi with 45,000 soldiers each; Rwanda with
40,000; and South Africa with 3 6,000.416 Chad, Zimbabwe, Tanzania, and

Kenya all have standing armies numbering between twenty and twentyfive thousand while the other African nations possess armies between one
and twenty thousand. 1 7 Angola, Ethiopia, and Nigeria possess significant
tank forces consisting largely ofT-55s, T-64s, and T-72s, although Angola
is reported to have T-80s. 41 8 South Africa's 172 Olifant Mk lA/B main

battle tanks are one ofthe most powerful armored force on the continent.4 9
Most nations also possess light artillery and mortars. 4 " Angola, Nigeria,
Ethiopia, and South Africa also possess capable air forces with fixed wing
aircraft.42' With its air cavalry battalion, Kenya has an effective landwarfare capability. 422 Smaller African countries' air forces consist largely
of transport and reconnaissance helicopters.423
While African militaries generally have good light infantry forces,
three primary weaknesses can be identified which severely limit regional
and sub-regional organizations' ability to conduct the full gamut of peace
operations. Each is considered below.424

operations in sub-Saharan Africa, they are not included in this list. The largest standing armies of
nations in both the AU and the Arab League include Egypt with 340,000 soldiers; Morocco with
180,000; Algeria with 120,000; Tunisia with 27,000; and Mauritania with 15,000. MILITARY
BALANCE, supra note 375, at 181-211.
416. Id. at 365-406.
417. Id.
418. Id. at 365, 379, 392.
419. See Army-Technology.Com, Olifant MK IB Main Battle Tank, South Africa, available
at http://www.army-technology.com/projects/olifant/ (last visited Oct. 30, 2006).
420. MILITARY BALANCE, supra note 375, at 365-406.
421. Id. at 365, 379, 393, 398.
422. Id. at 384.
423. Id. at 365-406.
424. In addition to these weaknesses, in their comprehensive study of the AU in Darfir,
published in 2005, William G. O'Neill and Violette Cassis also identify the following shortcomings
of the AU mission in Darfur: Slow and Cumbersome Command and Control; inadequate planning
and management capacity; lack of Rules of Engagement (ROE) Governing the use of force; weak
financial oversight; poor data management; a lack of good intelligence; a lack of political advisors
to assist military commanders with fostering a productive relationship with Sudanese officials, no
institutional infrastructure for interacting with NGOs, and no consolidated public information
strategy. O'NEILL & CASSIS, supra note 379, at 50-58. In her comprehensive study of African
capacity building for peace operations, Holt expands on the inadequate planning capacity. She notes
that while the UNDPKO has approximately 600 personnel on its staff, "both the AU and ECOWAS
are lucky to count two or three dozen full-time professionals serving in their entire DPKOequivalent headquarters." Holt Testimony, supra note 342, at 27. Indeed, she quotes Nigerian
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First, HIV/AIDS continues to ravage the continent and greatly impedes
the ability of African troops to deploy. This is certainly true for two of the
continent's most formidable militaries. The Military Balance 2005-2006
reports, for example, that at least two South African battalions are thought
to have a staggering HIV infection rate of eighty-three percent.425
Similarly, an estimated forty-three percent of the Nigerian military is
believed to be HIV positive.426 As The MilitaryBalance also notes, there
is justifiable concern that deployed peacekeepers increased infection rates.
For example, after Nigerian peacekeepers deployed to Liberia, the HIV
infection rate increase from three to seven percent.427
Second, Africa is a vast continent (three times the size of the United
States) with poor infrastructure. Regional and sub-regional organizations'
lack of a strategic airlift capability to transport troops is a second major
weakness in performing peace operations. Quite simply, while African
nations may possess the requisite will, they are simply incapable of
transporting troops and equipment across large areas for participation in
peace operations. The AU operation in the Sudan, for example, was only
made possible when NATO agreed in the summer of 2005 to help airlift
troops into Darfur.428
A final problem is the "tooth to tail" ratio of modern African
militaries. 429 By and large, African militaries are not self-sustaining in the
field and require outside logistical support.43 ° In the Darfur operation, for
example, AU helicopters and vehicles routinely run out of fuel and some
soldiers hardly have ammunition to defend themselves, never mind

Foreign Minister Oluyem Adenji who argues "that the biggest gaps in African capacity are in
planning and sustaining regional organizations." Id. at 43.
425. MILITARY BALANCE, supranote 375, at 359.
426. Id.
427. Id.
428. From July 1, 2005-October 31,2005, NATO (particularly Greece and the United States)
transported AU troops and equipment to Darfur in C-130s and Globemaster III cargo planes.
O'NEILL & CASSIS, supra note 379, at 63-64.
429. See generally Hackworth, supranote 153.
430. See, e.g., Holt Testimony, supra note 342, at 4. In addition to funding troops once they
are in the field, African organizations also have tremendous problems in initially funding
operations. Aboagye notes that the AU did not have enough cash in its support fund to pay AMIB's
$134 million price tag and member support "fell far short of the budget." Aboagye, supra note 372,
at 13. Often, it is non-African parties who provide most of the funds for such operations. For
example, the U.S. contributed $11 million to AMIB. Frazer Testimony, supra note 368, at 4. The
United States has thus far contributed $167 million to AMIS. Cooke Testimony, supra note 362,
at4.
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" ' Commenting on AMIS's logistical plan,
thousands of civilians.43
William
G. O'Neill and Violette Cassis write:

There was no real logistics plan. The first three Military Observers
had one satellite phone and no vehicle or lodgings when they
arrived. Troops lived in rented private houses for several months
until the American engineering firm ... constructed camps and
arranged for.., services.... The number of vehicles and aircraft
and the capacity to re-supply and repair all equipment is grossly
inadequate.43 2

While certainly significant, none of these weaknesses is
insurmountable. With appropriate assistance from the United Nations and
the West, the role of African regional and sub-regional organizations in
peace operations can go from being a hope to a promise.
VI. CONCLUSION

This Article has sought to answer the following; whether a peace
operation undertaken without Security Council authorization can be
considered legitimate, and if so, who is best placed to undertake such an
operation.
With regard to the first question, institutional change at the AU as well
as peace operations undertaken in Iraq, Haiti, and Kosovo have slowly
transformed the debate on the permissibility of peace operations in Africa
from one of"Westphalian Sovereignty" to a normative imperative which
sanctions military intervention to prevent gross human rights violations.
This is a welcome shift for humanity. This Article endorses the framework
proposed by the International Commission on Intervention and State
Sovereignty in its landmark report The Responsibility to Protect and GA
Resolution 60, codifying a right of humanitarian intervention in the face
of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity
when national autho-fties fail. Nonetheless, old habits die hard. The
current impasse on Darfur and the shameful U.N. kowtowing to the
murderous regime in Sudan threatens to eviscerate the promise GA
Resolution 60 held out. If the resolution meant anything, it means that the

431. Rob Crilly, "Peacekeeping"a Struggle in Sudan:African Union'sForceOutgunnedand
Spread Thin, USA TODAY, Nov. 30, 2005, at 5A.
432. O'NEILL & CASSIS, supra note 379, at 51.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2007

79

Florida Journal of International Law, Vol. 19, Iss. 1 [2007], Art. 3

154

FLORIDA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 19

AU force in Darfur must be replaced with a Chapter VII U.N. peace
operation; regardlessof whether Khartoum's brutal regime consents.
With regard to the second question, African regional and sub-regional
organizations in partnership with the West and the United Nations are the
best hope for maintaining peace and security on the continent. To realize
the full potential of African regional and sub-regional organizations, both
the West and the United Nations must provide critical training, funding,
and logistical support to African forces. The Global Peace Operations
Initiative unveiled at the 2004 G8 summit is a positive first step, but much
more must be done. Only in a truly joint endeavor between the West and
Africa will millions of Africans be saved from hell.
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